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Introduction
The federal courts of appeals are in substantial disarray on an issue of
threshold importance to the issuance of preliminary injunctive relief. One set
of circuits says that the traditional role of such relief is the preservation ofthe
"status quo," and thus accords disfavored status to preliminary orders that are
mandatory in form or that otherwise upset the status quo.' In these circuits, a
party seeking a preliminary injunction must satisfy a heightened standard of
proof requiring a clear and compelling showing of the propriety of such relief.
Another set of circuits rejects this view. These circuits apply a uniform stan-
dard to all requests for preliminary relief.2
Despite the clear split of authority, the competing circuit opinions have
made little effort to engage in any substantive dialogue on this issue. For the
most part; each set of circuits has cited its own decisions in support of its own
particular approach to the matter without any attempt at critical analysis ofthe
competing position. This Article seeks to engage the debate that is currently
lacking. It does so first by tracing the historical pedigree of the heightened
standard and then by evaluating the role of the status quo under the predomi-
nant theoretical model offered to explain the role of preliminary relief. Ulti-
mately, the Article concludes that the heightened standard is historically and
theoretically unsound, and that the circuits that adopt a uniform standard have
the better approach.
I. The Current Rift in the Circuit Courts
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not prescribe a standard for the
issuance ofpreliminary injunctions. Rule 65 addresses collateral requirements
of notice, duration, form, and security, but leaves the threshold questions of
whether and when a preliminary injunction should issue to the discretion of
the courts in accordance with traditional principles of equity3
1. See infra notes 18-55 and accompanying text
2. See infra notes 56-72 and accompanying text.
3. FED. R. Civ. P. 65; see also Vault Corp. v. Quaid Software, Ltd., 655 F. Supp. 750,
757 (E.D. La. 1987) (asserting that "[t]he grant or denial of a preliminary injunction rests in the
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Despite the absence of a uniform rule on these threshold questions, the
federal circuit courts are largely in agreement as to the substance of the
standard that generally governs the issuance of a preliminary injunction.
Although the precise verbal formulations often vary from circuit to circuit, it
is generally agreed that the following factors are relevant:4 (1) the moving
party's likelihood of success on the merits; (2) irreparable harm to the moving
party if the preliminary injunction is improperly denied; (3) irreparable harm
to the non-moving party if the preliminary injunction is improperly granted;
and (4) the "public interest.
'5
discretion of the trial court"), aff'd, 847 F.2d 255 (5th Cir. 1988); CHARLEs ALAN WRIGHT ET
AL., llA FEDERAL PRAcriC AND PROCEDURE § 2941 (2d ed. 1995) (asserting that "the
substantive prerequisites for obtaining an equitable remedy as well as the general availability
of injunctive relief are not altered by the rule and depend on traditional principles of equity
jurisdiction"); Arnistead M. Dobie, The FederalRules of Civil Procedure, 25 VA. L. REV. 261,
301 (1939) (indicating that Advisory Committee on rules "played quite safe and made very few
changes in the existing practice" on preliminary injunctions). The notion that federal judicial
power to issue a preliminary injunction derives from the inherent powers historically assumed
by the courts of equity was reinforced by the Supreme Court's recent decision in Grupo
Mexicano de Desarrollo, SA. v. Alliance Bond Fund, Inc., 527 U.S. 308,333 (1999) (declaring
that district court lacked power to issue preliminary injunction freezing defendants' use of their
unencumbered assets pending adjudication of rights to assets because historically such orders
were not available from court of equity and thus were not within equitable powers conferred by
Judiciary Act of 1789).
4. Previous critiques of the case law in this area lambasted the lower courts for their
failure to agree on the number and substance ofthe relevant factors. See LinzAudain, OfPosner,
and Newton, and Twenty-First Century Law: An Economic and Statistical Analsis of the
Posner Rule for Granting Preliminary Injunctions, 23 LoY. L.A. L. REV. 1215, 1222 (1990)
(asserting that "the federal courts use two, three, four and five-step standards without any appar-
ent logic to their choice" and that "even their 'four-part' standards differ from each other"); John
Leubsdorf, The Standardfor Preliminary Injunctions, 91 HARV. L. REV. 525, 526 (1978) (de-
crying "dizzying diversity of formulations" in courts); Arthur D. Wolf, Preliminary Injunctions:
The Varying Standards, 7 W.NEWENO. L. REv. 173, 184 (1984) (lamenting "widespread dis-
agreement among the courts of appeals regarding the applicable criteria"). Such criticism is
overstated, at least as applied to the case law as it stands today. Perhaps as a result of this and
other criticism, the federal circuits recently have come to agree that the "applicable criteria" are
the four factors set forth below. And although the circuits sometimes differ in their articulation
of the factors, the differences generally do not reflect substantive disagreement as to the proper
areas of inquiry. See, e.g., Roland Mach. Co. v. Dresser Indus., Inc., 749 F.2d 380, 385 (7th
Cir. 1984) (concluding that "apparent discord" in Seventh Circuit as to proper preliminary
injunction standard is "mostly verbal" and expressing court's view that "[b]enath the welter
of apparently conflicting precedents" there is "agreement" on factors set forth above); WRIGHT
ET AL., supra note 3, § 2948.3 (concluding that "[t]he courts use a bewildering variety of
formulations of the need for showing some likelihood of success" but that "verbal differences
do not seem to reflect substantive disagreement").
5. See, e.g., Pitt News v. Fisher, 215 F.3d 354,365-66 (3d Cir. 2000) (indicating that
district court must consider "(a) likelihood that plaintiff will prevail on merits of its claim at
final hearing, (b) extent to which plaintiff is being irreparably harmed by conduct complained
of; (c) extent to which defendant would suffer irreparable harm if preliminary injunction is
58 WASH. &LEEL REV 109 (2001)
issued; and (d) public interest"); Entergy, Inc. v. Nebraska, 210 F.3d 887, 898 (8th Cir. 2000)
(stating that relevant factors are "(1) the probability of success on the merits; (2) the threat of
irreparable harm to the movant; (3) the balance between this harm and the injury that granting
the injunction will inflict on other interested parties; and (4) whether the issuance of an
injunction is in the public interest"); Jeneric/Pentron, Inc. v. Dillon Co., 205 F.3d 1377, 1380
(Fed. Cir. 2000) (requiring movant to show "(1) a reasonable likelihood of success on the
merits, (2) the prospect of irreparable harm, (3) a balance of the parties' hardships in favor of
injunction, and (4) no potential injury to an important public interest"); Ciena Corp. v. Jarrard,
203 F.3d 312, 322 (4th Cir. 2000) (indicating that court must consider "(1) the likelihood of
irreparable harm to the plaintiff if the preliminary injunction is denied, (2) the likelihood of
harm to the defendant if the requested relief is granted; (3) the likelihood that the plaintiff will
succeed on the merits; and (4) the public interest"); United States v. Power Eng'g Co., 191 F.3d
1224,1230 (10th Cir. 1999) (indicating that preliminary injunction is proper where "the moving
party shows: (1) a substantial likelihood of success on the merits; (2) irreparable harm in the
absence of an injunction; (3) the threatened harm outweighs injury which the injunction may
cause the opposing party; and (4) the injunction will not be adverse to the public interest"), cert
denied, 120 S. Ct 1718 (2000); Tefel v. Reno, 180 F.3d 1286, 1295 (11th Cir. 1999) (stating
that moving party must establish "(1) a substantial likelihood of success on the merits, (2) a
threat of irreparable injury, (3) that its own injury would outweigh the injury to the nonmovant
and (4) that the injunction would not disserve the public interest"), cer. denied, 120 S. Ct 1257
(2000); Davenport v. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 166 F.3d 356, 360 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (establishing
that court must consider whether "(1) there is a substantial likelihood plaintiff will succeed on
the merits; (2) plaintiff will be irreparably injured if an injunction is not granted; (3) an
injunction will substantially injure the other party, and (4) the public interest will be furthered
by an injunction"); Connection Distrib. Co. v. Reno, 154 F.3d 281, 288 (6th Cir. 1998) (stating
that district court must consider "(1) the plaintiff's likelihood of success on the merits;
(2) whether the plaintiff could suffer irreparable harm without the injunction; (3) whether
granting the injunction will cause substantial harm to others, and (4) the impact of the injunc-
tion on the public interest"), cert denied, 526 U.S. 1087 (1999); Platinum Home Mortgage Co.
v. Platinum Fin. Group, Inc., 149 F.3d 722, 726 (7th Cir. 1998) (asserting that moving party
must demonstrate that "(1) it has a reasonable likelihood of success on the merits of the its
claim; (2) no adequate remedy at law exists; (3) it will suffer irreparable harm if preliminary
injunctive relief is denied; (4) the irreparable harm it will suffer without preliminary injunctive
relief outweighs the irreparable harm the nonmoving party will suffer if the preliminary
injunction is granted; and (5) the preliminary injunction will not harm the public interest");
Ross-Simons of Warwick, Inc. v. Baccarat, Inc., 102 F.3d 12,15 (1st Cir. 1996) (indicating that
"trial courts must consider (1) the likelihood of success on the merits; (2) the potential for
irreparable harm if the injunction is denied; (3) the balance of relevant impositions, i.e., the
hardship to the nonmovant if enjoined as contrasted with the hardship to the movant if no
injunction issues; and (4) the effect (if any) of the court's ruling on the public interest"); Tom
Doherty Assocs. v. Saban Entr't, Inc., 60 F.3d 27,33 (2d Cir. 1995) (establishing that "a party
seeking injunctive relief ordinarily must show. (a) that it will suffer irreparable harm in the
absence of an injunction and (b) either (i) a likelihood of success on the merits or (h) suffi-
ciently serious questions going to the merits to make them a fair ground for litigation and a
balance of hardships tipping decidedly in the movants favor"); Doe v. Duncanville Indep. Sch.
Dist., 994 F.2d 160, 163 (5th Cir. 1993) (explaining that moving party has burden of showing
"a substantial likelihood of success on the merits, a substantial threat that the will suffer irrep-
arable injury if the injunction is not issued; that the threatened injury to him outweights any
damage the injunction might cause to the non-movant; and that the injunction will not disserve
the public interest"); United States v. Nutri-Cology, Inc., 982 F.2d 394, 397 (9th Cir. 1992)
(establishing that moving party must show "(1) a combination of probable success on the merits
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Two dominant standards have emerged for balancing these factors.
Under the first, the moving party's burden is to show that it is likely to suc-
ceed on the merits and that it will suffer irreparable harm if the injunction is
denied. Under the second, the moving party need only establish "serious
questions going to the merits" if it can also demonstrate that the "balance of
hardships" tips "decidedly" in its favor.' Inmost circuits, these are alternative
standards that represent two ends of a sliding scale or continuum; either
showing will support preliminary relief, and a stronger showing on one factor
may compensate for a weaker showing on the other.'
Although the Supreme Court's jurisprudence is relatively sparse in this
area, its precedents are largely in line with the prevailing, general approach
and the possibility of irreparable injury or (2) that serious questions are raised and the balance
of hardships tips in its favor").
6. Tom Doherty Assocs. v. Saban Enlm't, Inc., 60 F.3d 27,33 (2d Cir. 1995).
7. See Times Mirror Magazines, Inc. v. Las Vegas Sports News, L.L.C., 212 F.3d 157,
160 (3d Cir. 2000) (recognizing that grant or denial requires "delicate balancing of the probabil-
ities of ultimate success at final hearing with the consequences of immediate irreparable injury
which could possibly flow from the denial of preliminary relief); Doe v. Sundquist, 106 F.3d
702, 707 (6th Cir. 1997) (indicating that "the degree of likelihood of success that need be shown
to support a preliminary injunction varies inversely with the degree of injury the plaintiff might
suffer"); Cityfed Fim. Corp. v. Office of Thrift Supervision, 58 F.3d 738,747 (D.C. Cir. 1995)
(explaining that preliminaxy injunction "may be justified, for example, where there is a particu-
larly strong likelihood of success on the merits even if there is a relatively slight showing of
irreparable injury"); Walmer v. United States Dept. of Defense, 52 F.3d 851, 854 (10th Cir.
1995) (adopting "modified likelihood of success requirement" under which moving party may
avoid establishing "substantial likelihood of success" by demonstrating that balance of hardships
is in its favor and by showing "questions going to the merits so serious, substantial, difficult and
doubttul, as to make the issues ripe for litigation and deserving of more deliberate investiga-
tion"); Waldman Publ'g Corp. v. Landoll, Inc., 43 F.3d 775,779-80 (2d Cir. 1994) (finding that
preliminary injunction may be granted upon demonstration of irreparable harm and either
likelihood of success on merits or sufficiently serious questions going to merits to make them
fair ground for litigation and balance of hardships tipping decidedly in moving party's favor);
Stanley v. Univ. of S. Cal., 13 F.3d 1313, 1319 (9th Cir. 1994) (noting that two formulations
are "alternative" tests, but that "even if the balance of hardships tips decidedly in favor of the
moving party, it must be shown as an irreducible minimum that there is a fair chance of success
on the merits"); Abbott Labs. v. Mead Johnson & Co., 971 F.2d 6,12 (7th Cir. 1992) (expressly
identifiing "'sliding scale' approach," under which "the more likely it is the plaintiff will
succeed on the merits, the less the balance of irreparable harms need weigh towards its side");
Rum Creek Coal Sales, Inc. v. Caperton, 926 F.2d 353, 359 (4th Cir. 1991) ("As the balance
tips away from the plaintiff; a stronger showing on the merits is required."); Vargas-Figueroa
v. Saldana, 826 F.2d 160, 162 (1st Cir. 1987) (recognizing district court's authority to "weigh"
relative harms to parties "in light of the plaintiff's likelihood of eventual success on the merits");
Apple Barrel Prods. Inc. v. Beard, 730 F.2d 384, 389 n.1l (5th Cir. 1984) (recognizing that
court is to consider sliding scale analysis when reviewing four factors for preliminary injunc-
tion); Dataphase Sys., Inc. v. CL Sys., Inc., 640 F.2d 109, 113 (8th Cir. 1981) (noting that
"where the movant has raised a substantial question and the equities are otherwise strongly in
his favor, the showing of success on the merits can be less").
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mapped out above.' The Court's first substantive decision in this area came
in Russell v. Farley? In the course of upholding the federal courts' power
to order damages under a security bond issued in connection with a prelimi-
nary injunction, the Russell Court referred in dicta to the "settled rule of the
Court of Chancery, in acting on applications for injunctions," that preliminary
relief depends on a comparison of the balance of the harms to the two
parties.' Under this rule, the court is "to regard the comparative injury which
would be sustained by the defendant, if an injunction were granted, and by the
complainant, if it were refused."" Russell also contains the seeds of the
modem courts' focus on the moving party's likelihood of success on the
merits: "[l]f the legal right is doubtful, either in point of law or of fact, the
court is always reluctant to take a course which may result in material injury
to either party.
12
Thus, as early as Russell, the Supreme Court had adopted at least three
of the four factors currently applied by the courts. (The final factor - the
public interest - was added to the framework in the late 193 Os. 3) Moreover,
Russell's dicta also is consistent with the notion of a "sliding scale" - if the
moving party's "legal right is doubtful," then the court should be more "reluc-
tant" to enter the preliminary injunction. Contemporaneous treatises rein-
forced that the converse standard also applied: if the moving party's legal
right was "'plain and free from doubt,"' then preliminary relief would be more
clearly appropriate. 4
The modem Court's opinions are generally consistent with this approach.
Although the Court occasionally has characterized the moving party's show-
ing of success on the merits as a threshold element that must be established
8. See Wolf, supra note 4, at 174 (asserting that Supreme Court has "not established
hard and fast rules" regarding issuance of preliminary injunctions and that, "[a]t best, the
Supreme Court precedents serve as points of departure for federal appellate decisions which
quickly move in other directions").
9. 105 U.S. 433 (1881). For a discussion of some earlier cases that touched on prelimi-
nary relief more generally, see Wolf supra note 4, at 174-76.
10. Russell v. Farley, 105 U.S. 433,438 (1881).
11. Id. (citing W. KERR, INJUNCTIONS IN EQUrIY 209-10 (1871)).
12. Id.; see also Wolf, supra note 4, at 177-78 (asserting that "current standards for
preliminary injunctions" at time Russell was decided indicated that "if the movant could
demonstrate a clear legal right, 'plain and free from doubt,' the injunction would issue,"
whereas "if the legal right was in doubt, then the movant would have to show a balance of
hardships in her favor" (quoting KmRR, supra note 11, at 221-22)).
13. See Inland Steel Co. v. United States, 306 U.S. 153, 157 (1939) (stating that it is "the
duty of a court of equity granting injunctive relief to do so upon conditions that will protect all
including the public - whose interests the injunction may affect"); see also Wolf, supra note 4,
at 180 (asserting that Inland Steel was first case in which Court "emphasized... the need to
evaluate the impact of a preliminary injunction on the public interest").
14. Wolf, supra note 4, at 177-78 (quoting KERR, supra note 11, at 220).
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without regard to the balance of hardships," more recent decisions reinforce
the relevance of all four factors and suggest that they should be evaluated on
a sliding scale.16
In the midst of general agreement17 as to the substance of the threshold
preliminary injunction standard has arisen the sticking point that is the focus
ofthis Article. The current debate in the federal courts is whether the moving
party should face a stiffer burden where it seeks to alter the "status quo" than
it does when it seeks merely to preserve it.
A. A Heightened Burden: The Tenth, Ninth, and Second Circuits
Recent decisions in three of the Circuit Courts of Appeals have flouted
this prevailing wisdom." The Tenth, Ninth, and Second Circuits all have
15. See Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U.S. 922,931(1975) (explaining that plaintiff must
show that without preliminary injunction "he will suffer irreparable injury and also that he is
likely to prevail on the merits"); Sampson v. Murray, 415 U.S. 61, 90, n.63 (1974) (deciding
that district court was entitled to resolve issue of likelihood of success, but that issue did not
discharge court from finding that irreparable injury will occur); Exparte Young, 209 U.S. 123,
166-67 (1908) (stating that preliminary injunctions should not issue to restrain enforcement of
state statutes unless case is "reasonably free from doubt" and injunction will prevent "great and
irreparable injury"); see also Wolf, supra note 4, at 178-79 (discussing Young and other 20th-
century decisions in which Court arguably ignored balance of hardships as factor).
16. See Amoco Prod. Co. v. Village of Gambell, 480 U.S. 531, 542 (1987) (explaining
that "a court must balance the competing claims of injury and must consider the effect on each
party of the granting or withholding of the requested relief" and that "particular regard should
be given to the public interest"); id. at 545 (using likelihood of success on merits as basis for
evaluating "balance of harms" to parties); see also lton v. Braunskill, 481 U.S. 770, 776-78
(1987) (adopting balancing approach in analogous context of deciding whether successful
habeas corpus petitioners should be released pending government's appeal).
17. The degree of consensus should not be overstated. The courts have not offered a
unified, coherent vision of the proper standard on preliminary injunctions. See Leubsdorf
supra note 4, at 526 (concluding that "[t]he various standards articulated by courts and treatises
rest on no coherent theory about the purpose of preliminary relief'); Lea B. VaughnA Needfor
Clarity: Toward a New Standardfor Preliminary Injunctions, 68 OR. L. REV. 839, 841 (1989)
(asserting that "lack of uniformity" as to proper standard has "caused havoc in litigation"); id.
at 846 & n33 (suggesting that Supreme Court's failure to articulate clear standard has left lower
courts "free to employ a dizzying array of standards" and that commentators agree that "the time
has come for a uniform standard and that the Supreme Court should address this question").
Wrth a few exceptions noted below, the courts have failed to explain the logic of their choice
of the relevant factors, much less to explain what this logic says about the proper interplay
between the four factors. Not surprisingly, then, the courts "use a bewildering variety of formu-
lations" to express the threshold standard. See WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 3, § 29483, at 184
(discussing various formulations of "likelihood of success" factor). For the most part, however,
the "verbal differences" between the various formulations in the circuits are semantic and "do
not seem to reflect substantive disagreement" Id. at 187-88.
18. Other circuits occasionally have suggested that the status quo is relevant, but those
circuits have failed to articulate the precise effect on the moving party's burden of an injunction
that seeks to alter the status quo. See infra notes 56-59.
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adopted a bifurcated preliminary injunction standard. This standard imposes
a heavier burden where the moving party seeks to upset the status quo.
1. The Tenth Circuit
The Tenth Circuit adopted a variable standard in SCFC1LC, Inc. v. V7SA
USA, Inc. 9 In that case, plaintiff SCFC sought a preliminary injunction
requiring defendant Visa to process SCFC's subsidiary's order for 1.5 million
Visa credit cards.2 Visa had rejected the order upon learning that the subsid-
iary had been acquired by SCFC, which in turn was wholly owned by the
issuer of the "Discover" credit card (Sears).21
The district court granted SCFC's motion, but the Tenth Circuit reversed.
According to the Tenth Circuit, the district court failed to take account of the
fact that the preliminary relief sought by SCFC "would clearly have altered
the status quo" in that at the time of the court's intervention plaintiff "was
without the new cards, and Visa was continuing to refuse to approve the
order." Because the Tenth Circuit thought that such an injunction required
the movant to "show that on balance, the four factors weigh heavily and com-
pellingly in his favor," and because the district court proceeded without the
additional thumb on the scale that this standard prescribes, the court vacated
the district court's preliminary injunction. 3
In applying this heightened standard, the Tenth Circuit concluded that
SCFC had failed to establish "a substantial likelihood that it will succeed on
the merits" since the issues were "complex" and would require "significant
development before th[e] court could posit a meaningful prediction as to the
strength of [SCFC's] claims and the eventual outcome on the merits.
24
Moreover, the court concluded that SCFC had failed to establish that it would
suffer irreparable harm without the injunction, because the only evidence was
its own "business speculation" that competitors would "undercut its program
by offering the same product first" if SCFC were precluded from the mar-
19. 936 F.2d 1096 (10th Cir. 1991).
20. SCFC ILC, Inc. v. VISAUSA, Inc., 936 F.2d 1096,1097-98 (10th Cir. 1991).
21. Id. at 1098.
22. Id. at 1099.
23. Id. The Tenth Circuit has applied this heightened standard in subsequent cases. See
United States v. Power Eng'g Co., 191 F.3d 1224, 1235 (10th Cir. 1999) (affirming district
court's entry of "mandatory" preliminary injunction requiring defendant to comply with
"financial assurance" regulations adopted by the Colorado Department of Public Health and
Environment), cert denied, 120 S. CL 1718 (2000); Kan. Health Care Ass'n v. Kan. Dep't of
Soc. & Rehab. Servs., 31 F.3d 1536, 1542 (10th Cir. 1994) (emphasizing that "[m]andatory
preliminary injunctions impose 'an even heavier burden [on the movant] of showing that the
four factors listed above weigh heavily and compellingly in movants favor"(quoting SCFC
ILC, 936 F.2d at 1098)).
24. SCFC/LC,936F.2dat1101.
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ket.2s Finally, the Tenth Circuit found that Visa itself would suffer irreparable
harm if enjoined to issue the Visa cards in that the goodwill associated with
the Visa trademark would have been misappropriated by SCFC, and that there
was no evidence of "any credible significant harm to the public that would be
caused by a delay" in issuance of the cards by SCFC.
2. The Ninth Circuit
The Ninth Circuit has adopted a similar approach. Consider Stanley v.
University of Southern CaliforniaY The plaintiff in Stanley was the former
head coach of the women's basketball team at the University of Southern
California (USC). She sought a preliminary injunction "compelling USC to
install [her] as the head coach of the women's basketball team and to pay her
$28,000 a year more than she received when her employment contract ex-
pired." ' The district court denied plaintiff's motion, and the Ninth Circuit
affirmed. The court first suggested that the proper standard on a motion for
preliminary injunction depends on whether the relief sought is a "prohibitory
injunction," which "preserves the status quo," or a "mandatory injunction,"
which "'goes well beyond simply maintaining the status quo pendente lite
[and] is particularly disfavored."'" In the latter category of cases, the Ninth
Circuit held that "the district court should deny such relief 'unless the facts
and law clearly favor the moving party.' "'30 Because the relief sought by the
plaintiff'"would have forced USC to hire a person at a substantially higher rate
of pay than she had received prior to the expiration of her employment con-
tract," the court found that the motion sought to change the status quo and thus
"was subject to a higher degree of scrutiny because such relief is particularly
disfavored under the law of this circuit."3
Under this heightened standard, the Ninth Circuit held that the plaintiff
was not entitled to a preliminary injunction. The plaintiff had "failed to
present facts clearly showing that USC was guilty of sex discrimination in its
negotiations for a new employment contract" since the 'Vhrust of her claim
was her positionthat "she [was] entitled, as a matter of law, 'to make the same
salary as was paid to the Head Men's Basketball Coach at USC,'" and since
"[n]one of the authorities she ha[d] cited support[ed] this theory."32 More-
25. Id. at 1100.
26. Id. at 1101.
27. 13 F.3d 1313 (9th Cir. 1994).
28. Stanley v. Univ. of S. Cal., 13 F.3d 1313, 1320 (9th Cir. 1994).
29. Id. (quoting Anderson v. United States, 612 F.2d 1112,1114 (9th Cir. 1979)).
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 1321.
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over, although plaintiff had "presented sufficient facts from which it could be
inferred that she suffered emotional distress, loss of business opportunity, and
injury to her reputation," the court concluded that there was no proof of any
causal nexus between this harm and any wrongful conduct of USC, and in any
event "[t]he record support[ed] the district court's finding that USC would
suffer some hardship if the preliminary injunction issued."33
3. The Second Circuit
Finally, the Second Circuit adhered to the status quo standard in its
decision in Tom DohertyAssociates, Inc.. v. Saban Entertainment.34 The plain-
tiff in Tom Doherty was a book publisher that had entered into an exclusive
contract to publish and promote children's books based on defendant Saban
Entertainment's library of children's television programming. When Saban's
"Power Rangers" property "became a huge success - almost an obsession -
with children," the contract's "exclusive rights provisions" became "an alba-
tross rather than a necessary inducement" for the plaintiffpublisher 5 Accord-
ingly, Saban adopted a restrictive interpretation of such exclusive rights pro-
visions, entered into additional licensing agreements with other publishing
houses, and found itself the target of the plaintiff's motion for a preliminary
injunction requiring Saban to abide by its exclusive deal with the plaintiff and
to terminate its publishing contracts with plaintiff's competitors.36
The district courtgranted plaintiff's motion. The Second Circuit reversed.
In so doing, it indicated that the party moving for a preliminary injunction must
"meet a higher standard where: (i) an injunction will alter, rather than main-
tain, the status quo, or (ii) an injunction will provide the movant with substan-
tially all the relief sought and that relief cannot be undone even if the defendant
prevails at a trial on the merits."3" Specifically, the court explained that "a
mandatory injunction should issue 'only upon a clear showing that the moving
party is entitled to the relief requested, or where extreme or very serious
33. Id. at 1324-25. Other recent Ninth Circuit decisions applying this standard include
Barahona-Gomez v. Reno, 167 F.3d 1228, 1234-36 (9th Cir. 1999) (affirming district court's
preliminary injunction against enforcement of annual limit on suspensions of deportation
imposed under Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996) and
Dahl v. HEMPharms. Corp., 7 F.3d 1399, 1403 (9th Cir. 1993) (affirming preliminary injunc-
tion requiring defendant pharmaceutical company to provide experimental medication designed
for treatment of chronic fatigue syndrome under contract that provided that medication would
be provided to those who participated in trial so long as certain conditions were met).
34. 60 F.3d 27 (2d Cir. 1995).
35. Tom Doherty Assocs., Inc. v. Saban Entm't, 60 F.3d 27, 31 (2d Cir. 1995) (noting
that "huge success" of Power Rangers was established by "the record" and that "there is no
danger of this panel resorting to personal experience" on this matter).
36. Id. at 32.
37. Id. at 33-34.
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damage will result from a denial of preliminary relief."'38 In other words, a
party seeking to upset the status quo must "demonstrate a greater likelihood of
success.
3 9
Unlike the Tenth and Ninth Circuits, the Second Circuit has suggested
that this standard is tainted by some definitional ambiguities. In the Second
Circuit's view, "[d]etermining whether the status quo is to be maintained or
upset has led to distinctions that are 'more semantic[ ] than substantive. "'40
For example, the Second Circuit has suggested that the proposed dichotomy
between prohibitory and mandatory injunctions is illusory, in that "[a]n
injunction that prohibits a party from refusing to permit some act may, as a
practical matter, alter the status quo," and "many mandatory injunctions can
be stated in seemingly prohibitory terms."" In the specific context of breach
of contract cases, the Second Circuit has posited that "[a] plaintiff's view of
the status quo is the situation that would prevail if its version of the contract
were performed," while "[a] defendant's view of the status quo is its contin-
ued failure to perform as the plaintiff desires."'42
Despite these confessions, the Second Circuit has adhered to the variable
status quo standard. The Tom Doherty decision applied 'the heightened
standard of a clear or substantial showing of a likelihood of success."43 This
standard was deemed applicable because the injunction sought by the plaintiff
"might be considered mandatory" in that it "arguably alter[ed] the status quo
by doing more than is required by the Agreement" between the parties.'
Specifically, the Second Circuit noted that the preliminary injunction entered
by the district court required Saban to allow the publisher to license one
"juvenile story book" involving the Power Rangers, whereas the contract itself
merely gave the publisher "a right of first refusal if Saban decided to license
38. Id. at 34 (quoting Abdul Wali v. Coughlin, 754 F.2d 1015,1025 (2d Cir. 1985)).
39. Id.
40. Id. (quotingAbdu Wali, 754 F.2d at 1025).
41. Id. at 34 (citing Abdul Wali, 754 F.2d at 1026 (noting that injunction requiring prison
officials to deliver to prisoners published report discussing prison conditions was actually
"prohibitory in nature" because it prevented prison officials from interfering with delivery of
documents sent to prisoners by third party)). See also SEC v. Unifund SAL, 910 F.2d 1028,
1040 (2d Cir. 1990) (noting that injunction prohibiting two foreign securities purchasers from
violating securities laws in future is "prohibitory in form," but that it "accomplishes significantly
more than preservation of the status quo"); Phillip v. Fairfield Univ., 118 F-3d 131, 133-34 (2d
Cir. 1997) (stating that injunction prohibiting NCAA "from interfering with [plaintiff] Phillip's
ability to receive aid and play basketball" is "more appropriately viewed as prohibitory, because,
by its terms, it restrains the NCAA from acting affirmatively to interfere with Fairfield's
decision to award plaintiff a scholarship and to allow him to play basketball").
42. Tom Doherty Assocs. v. Saban Entm't, Inc., 60 F.3d 27,34 (2d Cir. 1995).
43. Id. at 35.
44. Id.
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such works."4 As ifto emphasize its discomfort with the status quo standard,
however, the court also offered an alternative basis for its application of a
heightened burden: that the "injunction thus gives [the publisher] rights that
cannot be undone" in that the license in question "will continue to allow [the
publisher] to publish the one work in question even if Saban ultimately pre-
vails" on the merits.46
The Second Circuit held that the publisher had carried its heightened
burden in Tom Doherty.' The court found the publisher's interpretation of
the contract "virtually indisputable," so that the publisher had shown "a clear
or substantial likelihood of success on the merits.1
48
More recently, the Second Circuit applied the status quo standard in its
decision in Phillip v. Fairfield University.49 In that case, plaintiff Darren
Phillip had been offered a scholarship to play basketball at Fairfield University,
but subsequently was declared ineligible under the NCAA's academic guide-
lines because he had failed to complete thirteen "core" high school courses
required by the NCAA. After Fairfield's request for a waiver of this require-
ment was denied by the NCAA, Phillip filed suit for breach ofthe covenant of
good faith and fair dealing and sought a preliminary injunction prohibiting the
NCAA from interfering with his opportunity to play basketball for Fairfield.
The district court granted this injunction, "reasoning principally that Phillip
both would suffer irreparable harm ifthe injunction were denied and was likely
to prevail on his argument that the NCAA breached its duty to Phillip by
arbitrarily refusing to grant him a waiver of its eligibility requirements.""
The Second Circuit remanded the case on the ground that the district
court's assessment of Phillip's likelihood of success was based on a misunder-
standing of Connecticut law,"1 bit not before expressing its agreement with
the district court that the injunction sought by Phillip was most "appropriately
viewed as prohibitory," and thus not subject to the heightened standard.52
45. Id. In entering this injunction, the district court explained that it
[C]onsidered this relief to be necessary because Saban ha[d] licensed others to pub-
lish children's books based on the Power Rangers without affording [the publisher]
a right of first refusal, and, the tastes of children being fleeting, [the publisher] must




47. Id. at 37.
48. Id. at 35, 37.
49. 118 F.3d 131 (2d Cir. 1997).
50. Phillip v. Fairfield Univ., 118 F-3d 131, 133 (2d Cir. 1997).
51. Id. at 135.
52. Id. at 134.
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Specifically, the Second Circuit explained that the injunction's prohibi-
tory nature was evident in its "terms":
[It restrains the NCAA from acting affirnatively to interfere with
Fairfield's decision to award plaintiff a scholarship and to allow him to
play basketball. Put differently, by prohibiting the NCAA from further
interfering with Phillip's ability to receive aid and play basketball, the
injunction permitted Fairfield and Phillip to continue the relationship to
which they had agreed - that between student-athlete and university53
Although the court reiterated its concession that the distinction at issue "'is
not without ambiguities,"'5 4 it also articulated its conclusion in terms of the
"status quo," explaining that "as a practical matter, the district court's order
preservedthe status quo" inthe sense that "Phillip's status as a college student
at Fairfield was... preserved by the injunction" because his ability to attend
school there depended on the "financial aid" made available by "the court's
order. 1
55
B. A Uniform Standard: The Third, Fifth, and Sixth Circuits
In many of the circuits outside the Second, Ninth, and Tenth, the state of
the status quo standard has been somewhat unclear. Many circuit court de-
cisions have offered the proposition that the preservation of the status quo is
the "purpose" of preliminary relief.5" Others generally have articulated the
view that mandatory injunctive relief that upsets the status quo is "disfav-
ored"' and should be "cautiously viewed and sparingly used." ' Beyond these
53. Id.
54. Id. at 133 (quoting Tom Doherty Assocs. v. Saban Entin't, Inc., 60 F.3d 27, 34 (2d
Cir. 1995)).
55. Id. at 134.
56. See, e.g., Ferry-Morse Seed Co. v. Food Corn, Inc., 729 F.2d 589, 593 (8th Cir. 1984)
("The primary function of a preliminsry injunction is to preserve the status quo until, upon a final
hearing, a court may grant full, effective relief."); Wetzel v. Edwards, 635 F.2d 283,286 (4th Cir.
1980) ("The purpose of the preliminary injunction is to preserve the status quo until the rights
of the parties can be fairly and fully investigated" (quoting Meiselman v. Paramount Film
Distrib. Corp., 180 F.2d 94,97 (4th Cir. 1950))); Wash. Metro. Area Transit Comm'n v. Holiday
Tours, Inc., 559 F.2d 841, 844 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (noting that "the purpose of granting interim
injunctive relief' is to "maintain the status quo pending a final determination of the merits of the
suit").
57. United Steelworkers ofAm. v. Textron, Inc., 836 F.2d 6, 10 (1st Cir. 1987) (suggest-
ing that "First Circuit authority does no more than suggest that courts disfavor injunctions that
disturb, rather than preserve, the status quo"); Martinez v. Mathews, 544 F.2d 1233, 1243 (5th
Cir. 1976) (holding that "[m]andatory preliminary relief, which goes well beyond simply main-
tining the status quo pendente lite, is particularly disfavored").
58. Jordan v. Wolke, 593 F.2d 772,774 (7th Cir. 1978), rev'd, 615 F.2d 749 (7th Cir.
1980); see also Wetzel v. Edwards, 635 F.2d 283,286 (4th Cir. 1980) (suggesting that district
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general cautionary tones, however, these courts have offered little in the way
of any specific indication whether the status quo should have any substantive
effect on the availability ofrelief.59 In fact, in some instances, the same circuits
that have suggested some ambiguous relevance of the status quo elsewhere
have questioned the viability of a variable standard.'
Other courts have rejected the notion of a variable standard by their defin-
ition ofthe status quo. The Third Circuit has suggested, for example, that the
status quo standard is merely a "summary explanation ofthe need to protectthe
integrity ofthe applicable dispute resolutionprocess."'61 Thus, accordingto the
Third Circuit, the four standard factors embraced in all circuits adequately cap-
ture the goal of preserving the status quo: to enable the trial court "'to attempt
to minimize the probable harm to legally protected interests between the time
that the motion for a preliminary injunction is filed and the time of the final
hearing."' 62 The Fifth Circuit has adopted a similar approach - albeit in a
court's authority "to issue a preliminary injunction, especially a mandatory one should be
sparingly exercised"); Celebrity, Inc. v. Trina, Inc., 264 F.2d 956,958 (1 st Cir. 1959) (suggesting
that there is "less reluctance to issue a preliminary injunction merely prohibitory in form that is
aimed at preserving the status quo").
59. See Teatron, 836 F.2d at 10 (refusing to articulate specific "stricter standard" but sug-
gesting that courts should "disfavor" injunctions that disturb status quo); Ferry-Morse, 729 F.2d
at 593 (acknowledging defendant's argument that "the granting of preliminary injunctions is not
favored unless the right to such relief is clearly established," but nevertheless finding that "this
[is] a case where mandatory relief could properly be found to be necessary to prevent irreparable
harm to planiff"); Wetzel, 635 F.2d at 286 (offering unhelpful standard that mandatory relief
that alters status quo "normally should be granted only in those circumstances when the exigen-
cies of the situation demand such relief').
60. Several Fourth Circuit decisions point in opposite directions. Compare Wetzel, 635
F.2d at 286 (suggesting that mandatory relief that alters status quo should be "sparingly exer-
cised") with Rum Creek Coal Sales, Inc. v. Caperton, 926 F.2d 353, 360 (4th Cir. 1991) (con-
cluding that "[t]he phrase, 'preservation of the status quo'... does not symbolize an additional
separate test," and that "the line between prohibiting the specific enforcement of a statute and
mandating another approach to enforcement is often blurry," and citing Wetzel for proposition
that standard four-factor test would apply even if injunction were "classified as 'mandatory'").
See also Tiffany v. Forbes Custom Boats, Inc., No. 91-3001, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 6268, at
*22 (4th Cir. Apr. 6, 1992) (unpublished per curiam opinion) (citing SCEC 1LC for proposition
that a "request for mandatory relief" is "subjected to a more exacting standard of review"). Fifth
Circuit decisions are similarly at odds with each other. Compare CanalAuth. of Flav. Callaway,
489 F.2d 567, 576 (5th Cir. 1974) (rejecting notion that there is "any particular magic in the
phrase 'status quo'" and deciding that "[t]he focus always must be on prevention of injury by a
proper order, not merely on preservation of the status quo") with Martinez, 544 F.2d at 1243
("Mandatory preliminary relief, which goes well beyond simply maintaining the status quo
pendente lite, is particularly disfavored, and should not be issued unless the facts and law clearly
favor the moving party."). For a discussion of the Martinez case in historical perspective, see
infra notes 196-211 and accompanying text.
61. Ortho Pharm. Corp. v.Amgen, Inc., 882 F.2d 806, 814 (3d Cir. 1989).
62. Id. (quoting Constructors Assoc. of W. Pa. v. Kreps, 573 F.2d 811, 815 (3d Cir.
1978)).
PRELIMNARYINJUNCTIONS AND THE STATUS QUO
decision that is flatly inconsistent with subsequent Fifth Circuit authority.63
Under the first Fifth Circuit decision, the "status quo" is relevant only where
"the court's ability to render a meaningful decision on the merits would other-
wise be injeopardy."'
The approach of the Third and Fifth Circuits consciously focuses on the
"irreparable harm" that might be suffered by the respective parties, not on
some preconceived definition of the status quo. "If the existing 'status quo'
is currently causing one ofthe parties irreparable injury and thereby threatens
to nullify" the integrity of the process, "then it is necessary to alter the situa-
tion to prevent the injury."'
The Sixth Circuit is the court that most explicitly has confronted and
rejected the heightened burden adopted in the Second, Ninth, and Tenth Cir-
cuits. Most recently, in UnitedFood & Commercial Workers Union v. South-
west Ohio Regional Transit Authority,' the Sixth Circuit confirmed its posi-
tion that there is "little consequential importance to the concept of the status
quo" and "that the distinction between mandatory and prohibitory injunctive
relief is not meaningful."'67 In so holding, the court expressly rejected "the
Tenth Circuit's 'heavy and compelling' standard" and held "that the tradi-
tional preliminary injunction standard - the balancing of equities - applies to
motions for mandatory preliminary injunctive relief as well as motions for
prohibitory preliminary injunctive relief."'I
Under this standard, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court's entry
of a preliminary injunction requiring the defendant state transportation agency
to accept plaintif s "proposed wrap-around bus advertisement."69 Defendant
had rejected the ad as "too controversial and not aesthetically pleasing,"70 and
63. See supra note 60.
64. Canal Auth. of Fla. v. Callaway, 489 F.2d 567,573 (5th Cir. 1974).
65. Ortho Pharm., 882 F.2d at 814. The Fifth Circuit's repudiation of the status quo
standard is even more explicit In CanalAuthority, the Fifth Circuit rejected the notion that there
was "any particular magic in the phrase 'status quo,'" stating that "(t]he focus must be on
prevention of injury by a proper order, not merely on preservation of the status quo." Canal
Authority, 489 F.2d at 576. According to the Fifth Circuit, although "[t]he purpose of a prelimi-
nary injunction is always to prevent irreparable injury so as to preserve the court's ability to
render a meaningful decision on the merits," this purpose is "not always" furthered "by preserva-
tion of the status quo." Id.
66. 163 F.3d 341 (1998).
67. See United Food & Commercial Workers Union v. Southwest Ohio Reg'l Transit
Auth., 163 F.3d 341,348 (6th Cir. 1998) (citing Stenberg v. Cheker Oil Co., 573 F.2d 921, 925
(6th Cir. 1978) (rejecting notion of "any particular magic in the phrase 'status quo,'" and
recognizing that "if the currently existing status quo itself is causing one of the parties irrepara-
ble injury, it is necessary to alter the situation so as to prevent the injury").
68. United Food & Commercial Workers Union, 163 F.3d at 348.
69. Id. at 346.
70. Id.
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the plaintiff union sued on the theory that 'the rejection of the ad violated its
First Amendment rights." The Sixth Circuit upheld the preliminary injunc-
tion without pausing to characterize it as mandatory or prohibitory or to define
the status quo. Instead, the court simply concluded that the plaintiff was
likely to succeed on the merits and that the balance of hardships favored the
plaintiff because "even minimal infringement upon First Amendment values
constitutes irreparable injury sufficient to justify injunctive relief."
72
ff. The "Status Quo" Revisited
The circuit split that is the subject of this Article is easily defined: one set
of circuits concludes that the "status quo" is a critical factor in determining the
appropriate preliminary injunction standard, while another holds that it is
utterly irrelevant." Although the essence of the conflict is relatively clear on
the face ofthe courts' opinions, the analytical substance ofthe debate has been
quite opaque. None of the circuits have offered much in the way of a theoreti-
cal framework for addressing the question. Both sides tend to cite their own
prior holdings, 4 snippets of dicta (such as the general notion that the purpose
ofpreiminary relief is to preserve the status quo)," and ipse dixit conclusions.
This Article proposes a twofold theoretical framework to fill this void.
First, the Article traces the historical pedigree of the equity courts' consider-
ation of the "status quo." Second, the Article analyzes the relevance of the
status quo under the predominant analytical framework offered to explain the
role of preliminary injunctions.
A. Historical Foundations of the Preliminary Injunction Standard
The Supreme Court's recent decision in Grupo Mexicano de Desarrollo,
S.A. v. Alliance Bond Fund, Inc.76 reinforces the role of history in framing the
scope of equitable power in the federal courts." In that case, American
investment funds had purchased unsecured, guaranteed notes from a Mexican
holding company.7 When the holding company defaulted on the notes, the
71. Id. at 347.
72. Id. at 362-63 (quoting Newsom v. Norris, 888 F.2d 371,378 (6th Cir. 1989)).
73. See supra note 7 and accompanying text (discussing two dominant standards that have
emerged regarding preliminary injunction factors).
74. See discussion infra notes 192-95, 224-27 (noting Ninth, Tenth, and Second Circuit's
tendency to cite their own holdings).
75. See supra note 59.
76. 527 U.S. 308 (1999).
77. Grupo Mexicano de DeSarrollo, S.A. v. Alliance Bond Fund, Inc., 527 U.S. 308
(1999).
78. Id. at 310.
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investment fands accelerated the principal, filed suit for breach of contract,
and sought a preliminary injunction against the holding company's transfer of
unencumbered assets pending the adjudication of the rights to those assets.79
The district court granted the investment funds' motion for preliminary in-
junction on the theory that such an order was necessary to prevent the frustra-
tion of a judgment against the holding company in the event of its insol-
vency80 The Second Circuit affirned, but the Supreme Court reversed on a
five to four vote.81
The Court's decision turned primarily on its understanding of the histori-
cal equitable power as it existed in the eighteenth century.' Because "[t]he
Judiciary Act of 1789 conferred on the federal courts jurisdiction over 'all
suits ... in equity,"' the Court began with the premise that 'the 'jurisdiction'
thus conferred... is an authority to administer in equity suits the principles
of the system of judicial remedies which had been devised and was being
administered by the English Court of Chancery at the time of the separation
of the two countries. ' "a Under its view of the historical practice of the courts,
the preliminary injunction entered in Grupo Mexicano was inappropriate
because it was inconsistent with the historical "general rule that a judgment
establishing the debt was necessary before a court of equity would interfere
with the debtor's use of his property.""4
Thus, Grupo Mexicano indicates that history is a crucial guidepost in
evaluating the scope of federal equitable power. If the "principles of the
system of judicial remedies" administered by the English Court of Chancery
assigned doctrinal significance to the "status quo," then the bifurcated stan-
dard adopted in the Second, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits may be in line with the
historical equitable jurisdiction conferred on the federal courts.
Despite the crucial role of history, the courts have made little effort to
trace the historical pedigree of the judicial treatment of the status quo. If they
had done so, they would have found that the courts' discussion of the status





83. Id. at 318 (quoting Judiciary Act of 1789, 1 Stat 78, § 11; Atlas Life Ins. Co. v.
W.I.S., Inc., 306 U.S. 563,568 (1939)).
84. Id. at 321. The dissent accepted the propriety of the majority's historical inquiry, but
complained that the majority's analysis "relie[d] on an unjustifiably static conception of equity
jurisdiction." Id at 336 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). In the dissent's view, the Court had "never
limited federal equity jurisdiction to the specific practices and remedies of the pro-Revolution-
ary Chancellor," but instead always had "valued the adaptable character of federal equitable
power." Id.
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status quo was not given any independent doctrinal significance during this
period.8" Similarly, Chancery courts in the same era began to advert to a dis-
tinction between mandatory and prohibitory injunctions, but again they did
not ascribe any controlling doctrinal significance to the distinction6 As de-
scribed in detail below, judicial adoption of a bifurcated preliminary injunc-
tion standard has only the shallowest of historical roots, and thus cannot be
justified on historical grounds.
1. The Status Quo in the Courts of Chancery
Advocates of the bifurcated standard would have a difficult time tracing
the roots of the status quo criterion to the eighteenth-century Court of Chan-
cery. In fact, historical commentators generally have agreed that the modem
notion of a special standard for preliminary injunctions did not take hold until
well into the nineteenth century" Before that era, 'the interlocutory injunc-
tion was not yet regarded as an extraordinary decree requiring special justifi-
cation," and "[t]he cases concentrated on the availability of injunctive relief,
not [on] whether it should be preliminary or final."'
The seeds of the modem notion of a special standard for preliminary
injunctions were sown in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. During
this era, the Court of Chancery began to speak in terms of irreparable harms
and of an assessment of the outcome on the merits. In Tonson v. Walker, 9 for
example, the Lord Chancellor proceeded on the premise that "if the case is
doubtful, that may be a ground to grant an injunction until the matter can be
considered at the hearing."9 In other cases, the Chancellor expressly began
to speak of balancing hardships, concluding in one case that an interlocutory
injunction "was very proper to stay [defendants] from doing an act, which if
it turned out they had no right to do, would be irreparable,"'" while refusing
in another to enjoin defendants because "in case the right should be found
85. See infra notes 93-138 and accompanying text (discussing Chancery courts' use of
'status quo').
86. See infra notes 141-66 and accompanying text
87. See Susan H. BlackA NewLookatPreliminaryInjunctions: Can Principlesfrom the
Past OfferAny Guidelines to Decisionmakers in the Future?, 36 ALA. L. REV. 1, 5 (1984) ("Not
until the nineteenth century did courts begin to formulate standards for granting or denying
preliminary injunctions."); Leubsdorf, supra note 4, at 527-28 (concluding that "ft]he idea that
there should be a single standard for all preliminary injunction cases emerged in nineteenth-
century England").
88. See Leubsdorf, supra note 4, at 528.
89. 36 Eng. Rep. 1017 (Ch. 1752).
90. Tonson v. Walker, 36 Eng. Rep. 1017,1020 (Ch. 1752).
91. Mogg v. Mogg, 21 Eng. Rep. 432 (Ch. 1786).
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with them, they would by such prohibition receive a prejudice that he could
not compensate nor make good to them."'92
By the nineteenth century, the Court of Chancery first began to speak of
the role ofpreliminary injunctions in preserving the "status quo."' The court's
seminal use of this phrase seems to have appeared in Great Western Railway
Co. v. Birmingham & Oxford Junction Railway Co.94 Inthat case, the plaintiff
Great Western Railway Co. entered into a contract to purchase the defendant
railway upon its completion.' The contract provided that all parties would
concur in an application to Parliament to secure any necessary powers to carry
the agreement into effect.96 Before the contract was fulfilled, defendant began
to construct its railway in a manner inconsistent with the contract and took
steps toward selling the railway to a third party.' Great Western sued for
specific performance and sought a preliminary injunction against the defen-
dant's disposition of its railway; the Court of Chancery affrmed the issuance
of such injunctive relief.' In so doing, Lord Cottenham articulated the purpose
of preliminary relief in terms familiar to the modem ear:
It is certain that the Court will in many cases interfere andpreserve prop-
erty in statu quo during the pendency of a suit, in which the rights to it are
tobe decided, and thatwithout expressing, and oftenwithout havingmeans
of forming, any opinion as to such rights.... It is true that the Court will
not so interfere, if it thinks that there is no real question between the
parties; but seeing that there is a substantial questionto be decided, it will
preserve the property until such question can be regularly disposed of."
92. See Hills v. Univ. of Oxford, 27 Eng. Rep. 1194 (Ch. 1750) (refusing to grant inter-
locutory injunction against defendants' publication of bibles).
93. See Leubsdorf supra note 4, at 534 (noting that "[c] mphasis on preserving the status
quo as a main goal of preliminary relief did not emerge until late in the nineteenth century").
94. 41 Eng. Rep. 1074 (Ch. 1848). Professor Leubsdorftraces the substance ofthe status
quo standard to Blakemore v. Glamorganshire Canal Navigation, 39 Eng. Rep. 639, 650-51
(Ch. 1832), and the precise use of the phrase "status quo" to Shrewsbury & Chester Railway v.
Shrewsbury &Birmingham Railway Co., 61 Eng. Rep. 159,165 (V.C. 1851). Leubsdorf, supra
note 4, at 534-35. From these cases and from a synthesis in William Kerr's treatise, Professor
Leubsdorf draws the conclusion that the eighteenth-century courts had given a "new and unwar-
ranted emphasis" to the "preservation of the status quo." Id. at 536. As explained in detail
below, this is where I part company with Professor Leubsdorf. In my view, history does not
support the notion that the status quo performed any doctrinal function in the eighteenth-century
cases, nor does it support the broader conclusion that "recent criticism of looking to the status
quo departs from a tradition as old as Kerr's treatise." Id. at 539.




98. Id. at 1075.
99. Id. at 1076 (emphasis added).
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Chancery's articulation of the goal of preserving the status quo next
appeared in the analogous case of Shrewsbury & Chester Railway Co. v.
Shrewsbury & Birmingham Railway Co."° In Shrewsbury, the plaintiff
Shrewsbury and Chester Railway Co. (Chester) had entered into an agreement
with the defendant Shrewsbury and Birmingham Railway Co. (Birmingham)
under which both companies were to have the right (terminable upon three
years' notice) to use the other's rail lines, and which jointly permitted both
companies to provide "through traffic" along their joint line.' Birmingham's
shareholders soon became "anxious to get rid of this arrangement," and they
convened a special meeting to approve an agreement to lease their rail line to
the London & North-Western Company.1°2 On the eve ofthat meeting, Chester
filed suit for specific performance and sought a preliminary injunction against
the proposed agreement."0 3 Vice Chancellor Cranworth refused to enter the
injunction, but first extended Lord Cottenham's discussion of the role of
preliminary relief in preserving the status quo: "This Court... will, where the
necessity of the case requires it, interfere by injunction during litigation, not
only to preserve property in statu quo, but sometimes also to prevent the
Defendant from affecting it by contracts or conveyances, or other acts." 1°4
These early articulations of the goal of preserving the status quo were
soon synthesized in William Kerr's influential treatise on the Law andPractice
of Injunctions in Equity.' Kerr's treatment of "interlocutory" injunctions
spans several chapters, butthe discussion in Chapter II summarized the general
goal of such injunctions interms of the status quo:
The effect and object of the interlocutory injunction is merely to preserve
the property in dispute in statu quo until the hearing or further order. In
interferingbyinterlocutoryinjunction, the court does notingeneral profess
to anticipate the determination of the right, but merely gives as its opinion
that there is a substantial question to be tried, and that till the question is
ripe for trial, a case has been made out for the preservation ofthe property
in the mean time in statu quo.1°6
Superficially, Chancery's early articulations ofthe goal ofpreserving the
status quo might seem to lend historical support for the standard adopted in
100. 61 Eng. Rep. 159 (V.C. 1851).
101. Shrewsbury & Chester Ry. Co. v. Shrewsbury & Birmingham Ry. Co., 61 Eng. Rep.
159,163 (V.C. 1851).
102. Id. at 163-64.
103. Id. at 164.
104. Id. at 165.
105. WhiLm KERR, A TREATIsE ON TE LAWAND PRACTICE OF INYUNCTIONS IN EQUIT
(1867).
106. Id. at 11-12.
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the Second, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits. If the original understanding of the
role of preliminary relief is that of preserving the status quo, then perhaps an
order that does not fulfill this purpose should be subjected to a more stringent
standard. At least one modem commentator has argued that history seems to
bolster the modem fixation on the status quo. In his widely cited Harvard
Law Review piece, Professor John Leubsdorf concluded - based largely on the
above-cited authorities - that the nineteenth-century courts had given a "new
and unwarranted emphasis" to the "preservation of the status quo, 1 °7 and that
"recent criticism of looking to the status quo departs from a tradition as old
as Kerr's treatise.""1ca
Professor Leubsdorf s conclusions should not be taken lightly. As
described in detail below,1°9 the economic model proposed in his 1978 article
was illuminating and enormously influential. But with all due respect for his
pathbreaking model, Professor Leubsdorf s historical discussion - which was
offered merely as a preface to the substantive economic analysis - fails to
capture the essence of the nineteenth century treatment of the status quo.
The nineteenth century Chancery cases do not accord any doctrinal sig-
nificance to the status quo, much less establish a bifurcated standard that
requires a stronger showing in cases where the moving party seeks to change
the status quo. At most, the above-cited cases offer an uncontroversial de-
scription of the usual effect of preliminary injunctive relief: they state that the
court "will in many cases interfere and preserve property in statu quo during
the pendency of a sut,"" and that it "will... interfere by injunction during
litigation, not only to preserve property in statu quo, but sometimes also to
prevent the Defendant from affecting it by contracts or conveyances, or other
acts.""'
Professor Leubsdorf identifies Kerr's treatise as an important turning
point, and suggests that it gave the status quo "a new and unwarranted empha-
sis."0 2 Kerr's "emphasis," however, is no more than a generalization as to the
107. Leubsdorf supra note 4, at 536.
108. Id.
109. See infra notes 243-61 and accompanying text (discussing Professor Leubsdorf's
economic model).
110. CreatW. Ry. Co. v. Birmingham & Oxford JunctionRy. Co.,41 Eng. Rep. 1074,
1076 (Cit 1848) (emphasis added).
111. Shrewsbury & Chester Ry. Co. v. Shrewsbury & Birmingham Ry. Co., 61 Eng. Rep.
159,163 (V.C. 1851).
112. See Leubsdorf, supra note 4, at 536. Leubsdorf also criticizes Kerr for emphasizing
"the plaintiff's probability of success and the preservation of the status quo" without mention
of "irreparable injury or the balance of convenience." Id. In my view, Kerr did focus on
irreparable injury and the balance of convenience, so much so that it is clear that Kerr under-
stood that these factors, rather than the status quo, were of controlling doctrinal significance.
See discussion infra notes 122-26.
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usual effect of an interlocutory order. Kerr merely says that the "effect and
object of the interlocutory injunction is merely to preserve the property in
dispute in statu quo until the hearing or further order.""13 There is no reason
to infer that Kerr meant to ascribe doctrinal significance to the status quo,
much less to elevate the status quo above the then-settled focus on irreparable
harm and the balance of hardships, as Leubsdorf seems to suppose."
4
In fact, the context of the quoted language indicates otherwise. Kerr's
discussion ofthe status quo appears in a preliminary Chapter entitled "Injunc-
tions in General," which focuses on the basic "distinction between interlocu-
tory and perpetual injunctions." ' s First, Kerr explains that "[p]erpetual
injunctions are such as form part of the decree made at the hearing upon the
merits, whereby the defendant is perpetually inhibited from the assertion of
a right or perpetually restrained from the commission of an act which would
be contrary to equity and good conscience.""' 6 Preservation of the status quo
is merely put forward as a basis for contrasting an "interlocutory injunction"
from this notion of a "perpetual injunction."'"7 In contrast to a perpetual
injunction, which "is in effect a decree, and concludes a right," Kerr explains
that an "interlocutory injunction is merely provisional in its nature and does
not conclude a right;" rather, it "merely. . .preserve[s] the property in dispute
in statu quo until the hearing or further order.""' Kerr's second use of the
phrase in question again hammers home the distinction between the two types
of orders. Kerr notes that by entering the interlocutory injunction, "the court
does not in general profess to anticipate the determination of the right, but
merely gives it as its opinion that there is a substantial question to be tried,
and that till the question is ripe for trial, a case has been made out for the
preservation of the property in the mean time in statu quo.""
9
When read in this context, Kerr's use of the phrase "in statu quo" can
hardly be taken to have articulated a substantive legal standard. Professor
Leubsdorf hangs his contrary conclusion on the notion that Kerr's discussion
"says nothing about irreparable injury or the balance of convenience. '"120 The
lack of discussion of these standards, however, should not have been surpris-
ing in this context. In Chapter II (the only place where the supposedly talis-
113. KERR, supra note 105, at 11-12.
114. See Leubsdorf, supra note 4, at 536 (concluding that Kerr's treatise "contains some
curious omissions," because it emphasizes status quo but "says nothing about irreparable injury
or the balance of convenience").




119. Id. at 11-12.
120. Leubsdorf, supra note 4, at 536.
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manic phrase is given any significant play), Kerr's focus is to draw the above-
noted distinction between perpetual and interlocutory relief, not to rehearse
the standards that guide the courts in issuance of such orders.'
Indeed, when Kerr gets around to discussing those standards in subse-
quent chapters, he focuses on irreparable harm and the balance of hardships,
yet utterly ignores the notion of the status quo. Chapter XV covers
extensively the "Protection of Legal Rights to Property by Injunctions Pending
Trial of Rights.' M  In that chapter, Kerr explains that "irreparable" harm -
meaning harm that is "not adequately reparable by damages at law" - is "the
equity on which the interference of the court by interlocutory injunction is
founded."'" Thus, "a man who seeks the aid of the court" by entry of a pre-
liminary injunction "must be able to satisfy the court that its interference is
necessaryto protect him from that species of injury which the court calls irrep-
arable."'. 24 Kerr also announces a balance of hardships approach. He asserts
that the decision whether to enter preliminary relief "is governed by the
consideration as to the comparative mischief or inconvenience to the parties
which may arise from granting or withholding the injunction."'" Furthermore,
he explains that this "balance of convenience and inconvenience" contemplates
the entry of an interlocutory order only if "it appear[s] that greater damage
would arise to the plaintiff by withholding the injunction, in the event of the
legal right proving to be in his favor, than to the defendant by granting the
injunction in the event of the injunction proving afterwards to have been
wrongly granted.'
126
Notably, Kerr makes no mention ofthe status quo in his discussion ofthe
doctrinal standards that govern the issuance of interlocutory injunctions. His
entire focus is on irreparable harms. There certainly is no notion of a variable
standard of irreparable harm or of likelihood of success on the merits.
The Chancery decisions in Great Western and Shrewsbury have a similar
focus. As explained above, both cases involved interlocutory injunctions for
specific performance of railway contracts!"2 In both cases, the plaintiff
sought a preliminary order precluding defendant's disposition of its railway
to a third party.1' Despite the overlapping factual context, and notwithstand-
121. KERR, supra note 105, at 11-12.
122. Id at 196-216.
123. Id. at 199-200.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 209-10.
126. Id.
127. Shrewsbury & Chester Ry. Co. v. Shrewsbury & Birmingham Ry. Co., 61 Eng. Rep.
159, 164 (V.C. 1851); Great W. Ry. Co. v. Birningham& Oxford Junction Ry. Co., 41 Eng.
Rep. 1074,1075 (Ch. 1848).
128. Shrewsbury, 61 Eng. Rep. at 164; Great W.Ry. Co.,41 Eng. Rep. at 1075.
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ing the fact that both courts acknowledged the goal of preserving "property in
statu quo," the Chancellor in Great Western approved the requested injunction
while the Vice Chancellor in Shrewsbury refused it. 9
The Vice Chancellor's reconciliation of the two cases in Shrewsbury
reinforces the conclusion that Chancery's discussion of the status quo derived
from and was inextricably rooted in the irreparable injury rule, and therefore
not conceived as having independent doctrinal significance. 3 The Vice
Chancellor began with the concession "that there [was] a very great resem-
blance between the two cases."'3 He also acknowledged that in both cases
injunctive relief would maintain the status quo, either by preserving "property
in statu quo" or by preventing "the Defendant from affecting it by contracts
or conveyances, or other acts."" But the court's identification of the status
quo had no impact on the standard it applied to distinguish the two cases.
Instead, Vice Chancellor Cranworth's opinion in Shrewsbury focused on
the balance of irrparable harms. Cranworth argued that the plaintiff in Great
Western suffered irreparable harm but no "countervailing inconvenience that
would result from issuing the injunction,"' while concluding in Shrewsbury
that that '"balance greatly preponderate[d] in favour of the Defendant and
against the Plaintiff.''34 Specifically, the Vice Chancellor thought that the
harm to the plaintiffs in Shrewsbury was not irreparable because their losses
under their contract with the defendant could be calculated and remedied by
an award ofmonetary damages . 3 Afer all, the contract was terminable upon
three-years' notice, and thus the plaintiffs could be compensated at the "pres-
ent rate of through traffic" of "something like £12,000 a year. ""' If the
injunction were wrongly entered, on the other hand, it would "cause enormous
injury to all the shareholders in the company who are the present Defendants,"
in that the defendant would likely lose the opportunity of a long-term lease.
13 7
In short, the decision in Srewsbury turned on the Vice Chancellor's
assessment that '"he inconvenience ... preponderate[d] beyond all measure in
favor of' the defendant, whereas in Great Western the only "inconvenience"
was to the plaintiff.138 Thus, although the Chancery courts in the nineteenth
129. Shrewsbury, 61 Eng. Rep. at 165; Great W. Ry. Co., 41 Eng. Rep. at 1075.
130. Shrewsbury, 61 Eng. Rep. at 166.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 165.
133. Id. at 167.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 168.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 167.
138. See supra note 133 and accompanying text
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century had begun to speak interms ofthe status quo, they had not elevated the
phrase to any sort oftest or standard of any doctrinal significance. At most, the
phrase was used to describe the usual effect of preliminary injunctive relief.
Injunctions preserving the "status quo" may have tended to be the same injunc-
tions that avoided the plaintiff s irreparable injury at little or no inconvenience
to the defendant, but the status quo itself played no doctrinal role. Chancery
courts proceeded directly to an evaluation of the balance of hardships, unen-
cumbered by any requirement of identifying the status quo.
2. Mandatory Injunctions in the Courts of Chancery
As noted above, modem courts sometimes equate the preservation of the
status quo with the issuance of a "prohibitory" injunction.139 Under this view,
a "mandatory" injunction is seen as upsetting the status quo and is subjected
to the heightened preliminary injunction standard.
40
As with the status quo, the mandatory/prohibitory dichotomy is traceable
in some form to the nineteenth century Court of Chancery. In that era, Chan-
cery noted the distinction between "preventive" and "mandatory" injunc-
tions 41 and expressed some form of preference for the latter. The nature and
degree of that preference is not easily pinned down. At least one contempo-
rary treatise expressed the dichotomy interms that seem to support the current
approach ofthe Second, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits:
The object of an interlocutory injunction is to maintain the matters in
question in the suit in statu quo, until the hearing of the cause; and the
Court will not, therefore, except under very special circumstances, grant,
upon an interlocutory application before decree, an injunction which
virtually directs the defendant to perform an act142
Ifthe language of Edmund Daniell's treatise is an accurate depiction of Chan-
cery's approach to mandatory injunctions (in other words, to those that
"virtually directj- the defendant to perform an act"), then perhaps a heightened
preliminary injunction standard is historically justifiable in cases involving
mandatory injunctive relief. Daniell's proposed requirement of "special
circumstances" is reminiscent of the standard offered by the Second, Ninth,
and Tenth Circuits,143 but did Chancery adopt the modem requirement of a
139. See supra notes 49-55 (discussing Second Circuit decision in Fairfield Universit).
140. For an explanation of the failure of this dichotomy, see discussion supra notes 31-55
and accompanying text
141. Isenberg v. E. India House Estate Co., 46 Eng. Rep. 637,641 (Ch. CA. 1863).
142. EDMUNDROBERTDAIELTP1ADINGANDPRACTICEOFTHEHIGHCOURTOFCHN-
CERY 1661 (1894) (emphasis added).
143. See discussion infra notes 18-55 and accompanying text (discussing development of
Second, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits' heightened preliminary injunction standards).
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heightened showing of the balance of hardships or of a strong likelihood of
success on the merits?
The answer is almost certainly no. The authorities cited in the footnotes
to Daniell's treatise (including Great Western and Shrewsbury, discussed in
detail above)TM simply are not in line with the heightened standard applied by
some modem courts. In fact, nineteenth-century Chancery cases merely stand
for the proposition that mandatory injunctions should issue upon a traditional
showing on the balance of hardships and likelihood of success on the merits.
Daniell'streatise citesBlakemorev. Glamorganshire CanalNavigaion
145
in support of the "special circumstances" standard.146 To be sure, Blake-
more does advert to the distinction between injunctions that "restrain" and
those that "abate" or "undo what has been done," and even expressly indicates
that the latter is appropriate only in "peculiar circumstances." 47 The "peculiar
circumstances" identified by Chancellor Brougham inBlakemore, however, are
not in line with the heightened standard that currently prevails in the Second,
Ninth, and Tenth Circuits. Instead, Chancellor Brougham's analysis is entirely
consistent with the traditional preliminary injunction formulation. His refusal
to sanction the mandatory relief soughtthere - an order requiring the defendant
canal company to undo its earlier widening of the canal in question so as to
restore plaintiff's water supply to its original level - expressly turned on a
straightforward assessment of the balance of hardships, unencumbered by any
heightened standard of proof. Specifically, Chancellor Brougham concluded
that the "consequences" that would be suffered by the defendants in attempting
to "restore their works, if that were practicable, to the state and condition in
which they were many years ago" were simply more significant than the
"mischief complained of by the plaintiff.148 Indeed, the "mischief complained
of' by the plaintiffwas the "leading principle" or "guide" relied on by Chancel-
lor Brougham in evaluating the propriety ofthe mandatory order in that case.
1 49
His opinion makes no suggestion that this principle should be applied any
differently in cases involving mandatory relief...0
144. DAMEL, supra note 142, at 1662 n.5.
145. 39 Eng. Rep. 639 (Ch. 1832).
146. See DANIELL, supra note 142, at 1662 n.5 (citing Blakemore v. Glamorganshire Canal
Navigation, 39 Eng. Rep. 639 (Ch. 1832)).
147. Blakemore, 39 Eng. Rep. at 650.
148. Id. at 651.
149. Id.
150. As Chancellor Brougham's opinion in Blakemore further indicates, the Chancery
decisions of this era also reflect shades of the Second Circuit's apologies as to the definitional
ambiguities inherent in this dichotomy. See supra notes 40-46 and accompanying text (discuss-
ing Second Circuit's confessions). An order that appears mandatory in substance may be re-
phrased in formally prohibitory terms, as Chancellor Brougham recognized: The court may
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Similar cautionary tones about mandatory injunctions are audible in Lord
Westbury's opinion inlsenberg v. East India House Estate Co.' In his view,
the courts' power to issue a "preventive remedyV' was to "be exercised without
difficulty" and to "restj] upon the clearest principles."'52 The exercise of the
power to issue a "mandatory injunction," on the other hand, was to "be at-
tended with the greatest possible caution."' s3
Again, however, this "caution" was not reduced to a requirement of a
heightened showing of irreparable harm or likelihood of success. Instead, the
hesitation about "mandatory injunctions" seemed merely to stem from an
assumption about the balance of hardships. Whereas the balance ofhardships
apparently was assumed to favor the plaintiff who sought merely "preventive"
relief, that assumption might not hold where the plaintiff sought the more
invasive relief of a "mandatory" order. Thus, Chancery's "caution" about
mandatory relief dictated a specific inquiry into the plaintiff's irreparable
harm. As Lord Westbury put it, mandatory relief is "confined to cases where
the injury done to the Plaintiff cannot be estimated and sufficiently compen-
sated by a pecuniary sum."s 4 This is the traditional concept of irreparable
"indirectly... order something to be done, by restraining the party from continuing to keep
certain works out of repair." Blakemore, 39 Eng. Rep. at 651. Indeed, Chancery courts fre-
quently circumvented the supposed bias against mandatory orders in this way. Lane v.
Newdigate, 32 Eng. Rep. 818 (Ch. 1804), is commonly regarded as the seminal case. See, e.g.,
Blakemore, 39 Eng. Rep. at 651 (citing Lane as decision that went "to the very uttermost verge
of all the former cases"); Black, supra note 87, at 6 (asserting that Lane "began the tradition of
making an order prohibitory in form but mandatory in effect"). In Lane, Lord Eldon acknowl-
edged the general aversion to mandatory relief, but promptly circumvented it by issuing an order
prohibiting the defendant from failing to repair the defendant's property. Lane, 32 Eng. Rep.
at 819 ("The Order pronounced was, that Defendant ... be restrained until farther Order, from
farther impeding ... the Plaintiff... by continuing to keep the said canals, or the banks, gates,
locks, or works... out of good repair, order or condition.").
Chancellor Brougham's opinion in Blakemore candidly conceded that the slipperiness of
the mandatory/prohibitory dichotomy called its vitality into question. "[l]f the court has this
jurisdiction" to issue a substantively mandatory injunction in formally prohibitory terms,
Chancellor Brougham thought that "it would be better to exercise it directly and at once."
Blakemore, 39 Eng. Rep. at 651. On the other hand, in Chancellor Brougham's view, "having
recourse to a roundabout mode of obtaining the object [i.e., of issuing a substantively mandatory
order], seems to cast a doubt upon thejurisdiction." Id.
151. 46 Eng. Rep. 637 (CA. 1863) (cited in Black, supra note 87, at 7).
152. Isenberg v. E. India House Estate Co., 46 Eng. Rep. 637,641 (CA 1863).
153. Id.
154. Id. Interestingly, theIsenberg court's discussion itself reveals the speciousness of the
oft-supposed equivalence of "mandatory" injunctions and injunctions that alter the status quo.
Indeed, Lord Westbury's opinion in senberg indicates that in his view, a mandatory injunction
in that case would preserve the status quo. See id. at 641 (describing mandatory injunction as
"an order compelling a Defendant to restore things to the condition in which they were at the
time when the Plaintiff's complaint was made").
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harm. Despite Chancery's "caution" about mandatory relief Lord Westbury
did not lay down any requirement of a heightened showing ofirreparable harm;
he merely explained that the plaintiff had to satisfy the taditional standard.
To similar effect is Hervey v. Smith.55 In that case, the plaintiffs sought
an "interlocutory injunction" requiring the defendant to remove tiles that
defendant had placed upon the top of chimney pots, thus interfering with
plaintiff's ability to use the chimneys in question."6 Vice Chancellor Wood
found that he was "bound" to grant this "mandatory injunction" and based his
analysis entirely on a weighing of the parties' respective hardships. 7 On one
hand, Vice Chancellor Wood noted that "[a] most simple and summary act has
been done by the Defendant, which can easily be remedied" - "[h]e has put
tiles on the tops of chimneys, which can be taken off again."'58 On the other
hand, the hardship to the plaintiffs was significant, because they had "enjoyed
the use" of the "chimneys in question" for ten years and would suffer great
"inconvenience" if they were "stopped up in this summary manner."'5 9 Ac-
cordingly, Vice Chancellor Wood entered the preliminary injunction sought
by the plaintiffs, not upon some extraordinary showing of a clear likelihood
of success on the merits, but on the traditional ground that there were "[s]ev-
eral questions" that had been raised that were worthy of decision at a full
hearing.16°
The strongest repudiation of an equitable aversion to mandatory relief
appears in Vice Chancellor Stuart's opinion in Beadel v. Perry." The plain-
tiff in that case sought an interlocutory order requiring the defendant to take
down a wall that he had built in obstruction of plaintiff's rights under the
common law doctrine of "ancient lights."'16 In entering this mandatory injunc-
tion, Vice Chancellor Stuart referred to "a supposed rule of the Court, that
mandatory injunctions cannot properly be made, except at the hearing of the
cause," but claimed that he had "never heard of such a rule."' 63 "Looking at
155. 64 Eng. Rep. 510 (V.C. 1855).




160. Id. at 511-512.
161. 3 L.R.-Eq. 465 (1866).
162. Beadel v. Perry, 3 L.R-Eq. 465, 466 (1866). The doctrine of ancient lights estab-
lished a property right against the construction of a structure that would block a window in a
neighboring structure in such a way as to require artificial light in order to read in the half of
the room nearest the window blocked by the new construction, provided the original structure
had had unobstructed access to natural light for twenty years. BLACK's LAW DICTioNARY 81
(7th ed. 1999).
163. Beadel, 3 L.R.-Eq. at 468. Presumably, this language was rhetorical hyperbole.
Several Chancery decisions had referred to some form of aversion to mandatory relief. See, e.g.,
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all the circumstances of th[e] case," Vice Chancellor Stuart concluded that he
was "bound to make an order for a mandatory injunction."'64 Again, the
relevant "circumstances" were the standard considerations (specifically, the
fact that without the order "the injury which has been inflicted upon the Plain-
tiffs... would be continued") - not some heightened standard 65
Thus, nineteenth-century Chancery's notion of the "special circum-
stances" required to justify a mandatory preliminary injunction bears little
relation to the current heightened standard. Chancery's expressions of caution
about mandatory relief were simply offered in the context of the traditional
inquiry into the balance of hardships and likelihood of success.
16
3. Early American Case Law
In the nineteenth century, American decisions fell largely in line with the
practice of English Chancery in their treatment of the status quo and in the dis-
tinction between mandatory and prohibitory injunctions. By the early twen-
Gale v. Abbott, 6 L.T.R. 852, 854 (V.C. 1862) (asserting that "it was useless to come for what
was called a mandatory injunction on an interlocutory application... for the court [would] not
compel a man to do so serious a thing as to undo what he had done, except at a hearing"); Child
v. Douglas, 69 Eng. Rep. 237,244 (V.C. 1854) ("Plaintiff... has a right to an injunction to
restrain the building of the wall until further order, but I can make no order upon an interlocu-
tory application as to that part of the motion which relates to pulling down what has already
been built"). The obvious tension between the cases may be explained, however, not only on
the legal realist notion that different judges decided different cases according to their individual
proclivities, but perhaps also on the (sometimes silent) application of the standard balance of
hardships criteria. In other words, decisions refusing to enter mandatory preliminary relief may
simply reflect the fact that the hardships did not favor the moving party. Decisions circumvent-
ing the rule against such relief, on the other hand, may have arisen in circumstances involving
irreparable harm to the plaintiff and little inconvenience to the defendant
164. Beadel, 3 L.R.-Eq. at 468.
165. Id.
166. Previous historical analyses have reached similar conclusions, albeit without any
careful examination of the cases. See Black, supra note 87, at 7-8 (stating that "principle that
guided the courts in their decision to grant or to deny a mandatory injunction" was whether "'the
injury done to the Plaintiff cannot be estimated and sufficiently compensated by a pecuniary
sum"' (quoting Isenberg v. E. India House Estate Co., 46 Eng. Rep. 637, 641 (CA. 1863)));
Leubsdorf, supra note 4, at 535 (concluding, without analyzing cases, that "[tialk about manda-
tory and prohibitory injunctions... reflected, however waveringly, the same reluctance to decree
burdensome relief without a full hearing that was pervading judicial thought on interlocutory
remedies"). Judge Black's analysis also suggests that Chancery's discomfort with mandatory
relief may have grown out of two additional considerations: (a) a concern that the pitfalls in an
exparte decision would be magnified in cases involving "affirmative action" by a party not given
an opportunity to object at a hearing, Black, supra note 87, at 8 (citing Blakemore v.
Glamorganshire Canal Navigation, 39 Eng. Rep. 639 (Ch. 1832)), and (b) "the Chancellor's fear
of being unableto enforce a decree that required affirmative acts," Black, supra note 87, at 6 n.21
(citing Pound, The Progress of the Law, 1918-1919, Equity, 33 HARV. L. REV. 420,434 (1920)).
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tieth century, however, some American courts began to speak of a heightened
standard in cases where the moving party sought to overturn the status quo or
sought entry of a mandatory order.
a. The Status Quo in America
Initially, American courts' treatment of the status quo followed the path
established by the Lord Chancellor. The status quo was put forward not as an
element of a doctrinal test, but as description of the usual effect or purpose of
a preliminary injunction. The United States Supreme Court's early invoca-
tions ofthe status quo follow this pattern." In Parker v. Winnipiseogee Lake
Cotton & Woollen Co.,"* for example, the Court did not speak explicitly in
terms of the "status quo," but clearly invoked its essence, explaining that
"[w]here an injunction is granted without a trial at law, it is usually upon the
principle ofpreserving the property, until a trial at law can be had."'69 The
Court's seminal use of the phrase "status quo" apparently came several
decades later, inHoughton v. Meyer."' In that case, the Court explained that
the federal courts' statutory authority to issue an exparte temporary restrain-
ing order was "intended to give power to preserve the status quo when there
is danger of irreparable injury from delay in giving the notice required" in a
standard preliminary injunction proceeding.' None of these early decisions
spoke of the status quo as a doctrinal standard; it was always offered as a
description of purpose - and in the context ofthe overarching goal of prevent-
ing irreparable injury.
167. In at least one of its earliest decisions, the Court also expressed an understanding of
the basic standard for issuance of preliminary injunctions that was in line with the prevailing
practice in English Chancery. See Georgia v. Brailsford, 2 U.S. 402, 405 (1792) (opinion of
Johnson, J.) (explaining that "[i]n order to support a motion for [a preliminary] injunction, the
bill should set forth a case of probable right, and a probable danger that the right would be
defeated, without this special interposition of the court").
168. 67 U.S. 545 (1862).
169. Parker v. Winnipiseogee Lake Cotton & Woolen Co., 67 U.S. 545, 552 (1882)
(citations omitted) (emphasis added).
170. 208 U.S. 149 (1908). In an earlier opinion, the Court used the phrase in the related
context of the trial courts' power to issue stays pending appeal. See Hovey v. McDonald, 109
U.S. 150, 161 (1883) (affirming trial courts' "power... to order a continuance of the status
quo until a decision should be made by the appellate court, or until that court should order the
contrary"); see also Parker, 67 U.S. at 552 ("Where an injunction is granted without a trial at
law, it is usually upon the principle of preserving the property, until a trial at law can be
had.").
171. Houghton v. Meyer, 208 U.S. 149,156 (1908); see also Hutchins v. Munn, 209 U.S.
246, 249 (1908) (explaining that ex parte temporary restraining order is appropriate "where
irreparable injury may be anticipated if the status quo be not preserved").
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Early lower court decisions are of the same ilk. Indeed, Great Western,
Shrewsbury, and other Chancery cases discussed above72 were often cited and
quoted at length in nineteenth-century cases. The Circuit Court of Massachu-
setts quoted Great Western, for example, for the proposition that 'the court
will in many cases interfere and preserve property in statu quo during the pen-
dency of a suit," so long as '"there is a substantial question to be decided." '
The Sixth Circuit, for its part, quoted Shrewsbury for the idea that the control-
ling standard in cases of preliminary injunctive relief is "whether 'interim'
interference, on a balance of convenience or inconvenience to the one party
and to the other, is or is not expedient.1174
Thus, like their contemporaries across the Atlantic, nineteenth-century
American judges sitting in equity spoke of the status quo only as an adjective
to describe the usual effect of a preliminary order; the notion of a bifurcated
legal standard that assigned doctrinal significance to the status quo had not yet
taken hold. 75 This approach was also reflected in contemporaneous treatises
172. See supra notes 93-138 and accompanying text
173. Singer Sewing-Mach. Co. v. Union Button-Hole & Embroidery Co., 22 F. Cas. 220,
221 (C.C.D. Mass. 1873) (No. 12,904) (quoting Great W. Ry. Co. v. Birmingham & Oxford
Junction Ry. Co., 41 Eng. Rep. 1074,1076 (Ch. 1848)); see also Allison v. Corson, 88 F. 581,
584 (8th Cir. 1898) (citing Great Western and Shrewsbury for same standard as that stated in
City of Newton); City of Newton v. Levis, 79 F. 715,718 (8th Cir. 1897) (citing Great Western,
41 Eng. Rep. at 1076, and Shrewsbury, 61 Eng. Rep. at 166, for proposition that "[a] prelimi-
nary injunction maintaining the status quo may property issue whenever the questions of law
or fact to be ultimately determined in a suit are grave and difficult, and injury to the moving
party will be immediate, certain, and great if it is denied, while the loss or inconvenience to the
opposing party will be comparatively small and insignificant if it is granted"); Blount v. Societe
Anonyme Du Filtre Chamberland Systeme Pasteur, 53 F. 98,101 (6th Cir. 1892) (quoting and
following same passage).
174. Blount, 53 F. at 101 (quoting Shrewsbury, 61 Eng. Rep. at 166).
175. See Jensen v. Norton, 64 F. 662,664 (9th Cir. 1894) (discussing circumstances giving
rise to injunction). The Jensen court stated:
When a plaintiff in a court of equity brings a suit in good faith to obtain preventive
relief against a threatened injury, and makes a showing of facts sufficient to consti-
tute a cause of action within the jurisdiction of the court, and shows that his adver-
sary intends to, and probably will, ere a hearing can be had, commit acts which may
work irreparable injury to him, it becomes the duty of the court to exercise its power
at once by issuing an injunction so as to maintain the status quo until the cause can
be properly heard and decided.
Id. at 664; N. Pac. R.R. Co. v. City of Spokane, 52 F. 428,430 (D. Wash. 1892) ("The purpose
of a restraining order pendente lite, in all cases of this nature, is to preserve property which is
the subject of controversy, in its existing condition, until a final hearing and determination of
the cause .... ."); Farmers' R.R. Co. v. Reno, Oil Creek and Pithole Ry. Co., 53 Pa. 224, 225
(1866) (explaining that "sole object" of preliminary order is "to preserve the subject of the
controversy in the condition in which it is when the order is made"). A few nineteenth-century
decisions appear to have adopted the bifurcated approach, however, primarily in the context of
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on equity, which spoke of the status quo only in descriptive terms, and stated
the standard for issuance of preliminary relief in terms of the standard show-
ings on the balance of hardships and likelihood of success without regard to
whether the order in question would preserve or upset the status quo."'
b. Mandatory Injunctions in America
Early American decisions also inherited Chancery's apprehension about
mandatory preliminary injunctions. As inthe English Chancery decisions cited
above, there was no universal agreement as to the precise nature and degree of
the apprehension in the American decisions. At least one contemporaneous
treatise thought that '"he inclination of the American courts was, at one time,
very much against granting such an interlocutory injunction,""' and dicta in
some early decisions seems to support that characterization. InAudenriedv.
Philadelphia and Reading Railroad Co., 17 8 for example, the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court spoke of a rule "that an interlocutory or preliminary injunction
cannot be mandatory." 179 In so doing, the court acknowledged the Chancery
cases "in which a mandatory order has been made on an interlocutory applica-
intellectual property litigation. See, e.g., Whippany Mfg. Co. v. United Indurated Fibre Co.,
87 F. 215, 216 (3d Cir. 1898) (asserting that remedy of preliminary injunction "is a valuable
one," but "also a dangerous one," and should "never be applied when the complainant's case
is doubtful - except indeed where the object is merely to preserve the status quo"); Ladd v.
Oxnard, 75 F. 703, 733 (D. Mass. 1896) (asserting that in "patent, trade-mark, and copyright
nes ... , interlocutory injunctions do not ordinarily preserve the status quo," and accordingly
that "in cases of this character, it has not ordinarily been sufficient merely to" establish fair
grounds for litigation, and that moving parties in such cases should show that case is "clear and
strong").
176. See, e.g.,OEORGETUcKERBISPHAM,PRINCJPI OFEQUITYS14-15n.8(Sthed. 1893)
(concluding that "office of a preliminary injunction" is "to preserve the status quo until, upon
final hearing, the court may grant full relief' (citing Judge Taft in Toledo, A.A. & N.. Ry. Co.
v. Pa. Co., 54 F. 730, 741 (ND. Ohio 1893)) (citations omitted); III JOHNPOMEROY, EQUTY
JURISPRUDENCE 11-12 (1883) (describing "object of an interlocutory injunction" as "preserva-
tion of the property or rights in controversy until a full and final hearing upon the merits" and
stating that "an application for a preliminary injunction" will "generally be governed.., by
considerations of the relative convenience and inconvenience which may result to the parties
from granting or withholding the writ"); IMI WAXIAM WArr, ACTIONS AND DEFENSES AT LAW
OR IN EQUrrY 682-83 (1878) (asserting that court "will in many cases interfere by injunction,
to preserve property in statu quo during the pendency of a suit" and that in exercising its
discretion to decide whether to issue such order, court should "weigh the nature and extent of
the injury which the plaintiff will suffer if the order be withheld, and also the consequences to
the opposite party if the order be granted") (citations omitted).
177. BwPHAM supra note 176, at 514; see also WILLIAM MEADEFLETCHER, A TREATISE
ON EQurry PLEADINa AND PRACTICE 516, § 495 (1902) ("As a general rule, a mandatory
injunction will not be granted on preliminary application.") (footnote omitted).
178. 68 Pa. 370 (1870).
179. Audenried v. Phila. & Reading R.R. Co., 68 Pa. 370,375-76 (1870).
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tion," but dismissed them as "very extreme cases" that "ought not to be fol-
lowed as precedents."
80
For the mostpart, however, nineteenth-century American decisions recog-
nized that the supposed "rule" against mandatory interlocutory relief was not
a rule at all, but merely a reminder that such relief could not be entered without
the traditional showing on the balance of hardships. In In re Lennon,' the
United States Supreme Court broadly affirmed that the "power of a court of
equity... is not always limited to the restraint of a contemplated or threatened
action, but may even require affirmative action, where the circumstances ofthe
case demand it.' Justice Brown's opinion for the Court did not elaborate on
the relevant "circumstances," but his citation to Hervey, Beadel, and other
English Chancery decisions would seem to suggest that he intended no depar-
ture from the English practice described above.
183
In fact, other American decisions of this era expressly repudiated the
"rule" announced bythe Pennsylvania Supreme Court inAudenriedand applied
the standard preliminary injunction standard to mandatory orders. In his
capacity as Circuit Justice, Justice Field rejectedAudenried and other emerging
decisions "denying the authority of a court of equity, on a preliminary applica-
tion, to issue an injunction, even in a restrictive form, when its obedience would
require the performance of a substantive act.' 84 Indeed, Justice Field reviewed
the English Chancery decisions in some detail, and chided the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court for failing to recognize the equitable power to issue mandatory
interlocutory relief.85 Citing Blakemore v. Glamorganshire Canal Naviga-
tion, Justice Field explained that the "purpose" of preliminary relief is to
prevent "waste or destruction or disturbance until the rights and equities ofthe
contesting parties can be fblly considered and determined."' 86 And echoing the
180. Id. at 377. The court cited Lane v. Newdigate, 32 Eng. Rep. 818 (Ch. 1804), among
others, but thought that the Chancery's practice of stating a substantively mandatory order in
formally prohibitory terms rendered the decision "a precedent which ought [not] to be followed
in this or any other court." Audenried, 68 Pa. at 378. "A tribunal that finds itself unable directly
to decree a thing," according to the Pennsylvania court, "ought never to attempt to accomplish
it by indirection." Id.
181. 166 U.S. 548 (1897).
182. In re Lennon, 166 U.S. 548,556 (1897).
183. Id.
184. Cole Silver Min. Co. v. Va. & Gold Hil Water Co., 6 F. Cas. 72, 74 (C.C.D. Nev.
1871) (No. 2,990); see also Pokegama Sugar-Pine Lumber Co. v. Klamath River Lumber &
Improvement Co., 86 F. 528, 537 (ND. Cal. 1898) (rejecting "cases which announce the
general rule that a court of equity will not, by a preliminary order, change the status of parties,
require that which has been done to be undone, or restore property to a possession claimed to
have existed prior to the interferences and disturbances which are the subject of [the case]").
185. Cole Silver, 6 F. Cas. at 75-76.
186. Id.
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English Chancery approach described above, Justice Field emphasized that
although such irreparable harm can "[u]sually" be prevented by a prohibitory
order, there is no bar to mandatory relief where it fulfills this purpose - where
"the continuance of the injury, the commencement of which has induced the
invocation of the authority of a court of equity, would lead to the waste and
destruction ofthe property.1'1
Thus, the doctrinal focus was irreparable harm, not the form ofthe injunc-
tion. Contemporaneous treatises largely affirmed this approach. John Pom-
eroy's treatise on Equity Jurisprudence acknowledged that "it has been said in
some American decisions that a mandatory interlocutory injunction would
never be granted," but roundly rejected that "manifestly absurd" proposition as
"not only opposed to the overwhelming weight of authority," but also as "con-
trary to the principle which regulates the administration of preventive relief."
88
More to the point, the "principle" identified by Pomeroy that "regulates the
administration ofpreventive relief' is again the standard balance ofhardships.
Pomeroy explains that a "mandatory" order is proper where the plaintiff's
injury is "immediate, and pressing, and irreparable." 89 Other contemporane-
ous treatises are to the same effect."9
In sum, despite a few outlying decisions purporting to adopt a firm rule
against mandatory relief, American decisions from the nineteenth century
provide little historical support for the heightened standard currently in vogue
in a few of the federal circuits. Moreover, like their English Chancery contem-
poraries (but unlike some modern circuit judges), American jurists in the
nineteenth century understood that there was no necessary correlation between
the mandatory/prohibitory character of an order and the status quo.' Their
187. Id. at 76.
188. POMEOY, supra note 176, at391 n.2.
189. Id.at391.
190. Bispham's analysis is especially pointed in this regard:
Indeed, there would seem to be no good reason why, in a proper case, a mandatory
injunction should not issue upon preliminary hearing. Gross violations of rights
may occur in the shortest possible time, and a few hours wrong-doing may result
in the creation of an intolerable nuisance or in the production of an injury which,
if prolonged, might soon become irreparable. In such cases the interposition of the
strong arm of the chancellor ought to be most swift; and if the immediate relief
afforded could not, in a proper case, be restorative, as well as prohibitory, no
adequate redress would, in many instances, be given.
BISPHAM, supra note 176, at 515.
191. See, e.g., Toledo, A. & NM. Ry. Co. v. Pa. Co., 54 F. 730, 741 (ND. Ohio 1893)
(noting that "it sometimes happens that the status quo is a condition not of rest, but of action,
and the condition of rest is exactly what will inflict the irreparable injury upon complainant");
BIsPHAM, supra note 176, at 515 (noting that mandatory injunction may be necessary to pre-
serve status quo in sense that "if the immediate relief afforded could not.., be restorative, as
well as prohibitory, no adequate redress would ... be given").
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focus was on the settled inquiry into the balance of hardships, not on some sub-
jective determination ofthe character ofthe order or its effect on the status quo.
c. Origins of the Heightened Standard
The above discussion suggests that the heightened standard adopted in
the Second, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits has shallow historical roots and is not
traceable to the nineteenth century. This same conclusion can be confirmed
by tracing backward from the sources cited in the modem decisions.
i. The Historical Trail in the Ninth and Tenth Circuits
The Ninth and Tenth Circuits have relied on identical authorities in
adopting a bifurcated preliminary injunction standard. In SCEC ILC, Inc. v.
VISA USA, Inc.,"9 the Tenth Circuit relied on its own decision in Citizens
Concernedfor the Separation of Church and State v. City ofDenverl93 and on
the Ninth Circuit's decision in Anderson v. United States.'9 The Ninth
Circuit similarly relied on Anderson in its own adoption of the bifurcated
standard in Stanley v. University of Southern California.195
These decisions are only weak authority for the heightened standard for
which they are cited. Citizens Concerned merely suggests, by reference only
to 42 Am. Jur. 2d, Injunctions, §§ 16 and 20, 'Thaat mandatory injunctive relief
should be granted only under compelling circumstances inasmuch as it is a
harsh remedial process not favored by the courts,"'96 without attempting to
prescnibe the "compelling circumstances" that the court unquestioningly
adopted in the SCFC ILC case. Anderson is slightly more pointed and sup-
portive of a heightened standard; it provides that "'[miandatory preliminary
relief, which goes well beyond simply maintaining the status quo pendente
lite, is particularly disfavored, and should not be issued unless the facts and
law clearly favor the moving party.""'  Nevertheless, Anderson does not
192. SCFC ILC, Inc. v. VISA USA, Inc., 936 F.2d 1096 (10th Cir. 1991).
193. Id. at 1099 (citing Citizens Concerned for the Separation of Church and State v. City
of Denver, 628 F.2d 1289, 1299 (10th Cir. 1980) (requiring "compelling circumstances" to
impose mandatory injunctive relief that disturbs status quo).
194. SCFCILC, 936 F.2d at 1099 (citing Anderson v. United States, 612 F.2d 1112 (9th
Cir. 1979) (finding preliminary injunction that alters status quo "particularly disfavored" and
requiring "strong showing of entitlement").
195. Stanley v. Univ. of S. Cal., 13 F.3d 1313, 1320 (9th Cir. 1994) (commenting that
mandatory injunction altering status quo is "particularly disfavored" and that facts and law
clearly must favor movant to prevail) (citations omitted).
196. Citizens Concerned for the Separation of Church and State v. City of Denver, 628
F.2d 1289, 1299 (10th Cir. 1980).
197. Anderson v. United States, 612 F.2d 1112, 1114 (9th Cir. 1979) (quoting Martinez
v. Mathews, 544 F.2d 1233, 1243 (5th Cir. 1976)).
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explicitly prescribe the clear showing required under SCFC ILC; it does not
say that a party moving for a preliminary injunction must show that the
traditional factors weigh "heavily and compellingly" in its favor."r
Moreover, the historical trail disappears fairly quickly as one attempts to
trace the sources cited inAnderson. The Ninth Circui's opinion inAnderson
relies on earlier decisions out of the Third and Fifth Circuits, which generally
seem to confirm the requirement of a "clear" showing on the facts and the law
to sustain a mandatory preliminary injunction.1 Those cases, in turn, rely on
authorities that generally cannot be read to establish a heightened standard.2"
198. See SCFC ILC, Inc. v. VISA USA, Inc., 936 F.2d 1096, 1098-99 (10th Cir. 1991)
(requiring heightened standard for preliminary injunctions that (1) alter status quo, (2) are
mandatory, (3) afford substantially all relief sought).
199. Anderson, 612 F.2d at 1114, cites the following authorities: Martinez v. Mathews,
544 F.2d 1233, 1243 (5th Cir. 1976) (asserting that "[m]andatory preliminary relief... should
not be issued unless the facts and law clearly favor the moving party"); United States v. Spectro
Foods Corp., 544 F.2d 1175, 1181 (3d Cir. 1976) (concluding that "[t]he power to issue a
preliminary injunction, especially a mandatory one, should be sparingly exercised"); Exhibitors
Poster Exch., Inc. v. Nat'l Screen Serv. Corp., 441 F.2d 560, 561-62 (5th Cir. 1971) (suggesting
that "when a plaintiff applies for a mandatory preliminary injunction, such relief 'should not be
granted except in rare instances in which the facts and law are clearly in favor of the moving
party"') (quoting Miami Beach Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Callander, 256 F.2d 410, 415 (5th
Cir. 1958)).
200. A comprehensive pedigree chart of the cites in the chain of authority in question may
help to clarify the cites that follow in footnotes below. As noted above, Anderson cites three
principal authorities: (1) Martinez, 544 F.2d at 1243; (2) Spectra Foods Corp., 544 F.2d at
1181; and (3) ExhibitorsPosterExch., 441 F.2d 560. The chain of authorities under these three
decisions is as follows:
(1) Martinez, 544 F.2d at 1243, relies on Zugsmith v. Dav, 108 F. Supp. 913, 915
(S.D.N.Y. 1952) (stating that mandatory injunctions are issued only in "extreme cases,
where the right is very clear") (citations omitted); Gamlen Chem. Co. v. Gamlen, 79 F.
Supp. 622, 631 (WD. Pa. 1948) (noting mandatory preliminary injunctions that alter
status quo are granted only in "rarest of cases"); and Miami Beach Fed. Sav. & Loan
Ass'n v. Callander, 256 F.2d 410, 415 (5th Cir. 1958) (concluding that preliminary
mandatory injunction is only granted where facts and law clearly favor moving party).
(a) Callander cites American Lead Pencil Co. v. Schneegas, 178 F. 735, 738-39
(N.D. Ga. 1910) (commenting that mandatory injunctions are almost never granted
at preliminary stage).
(i) Zugsmith relies on Trautwein v. Moreno Mutual Irrigation Co., 22 F.2d 374,
376 (9th Cir. 1927) (commenting that mandatory preliminary injunctions are issued
only "in extreme cases where the right is very clear") (citation omitted).
(2) Spectro Foods, 544 F.2d at 1181, relies onDorfrnan v. Boozer, 414 F.2d 1168, 1173
(D.C. Cir. 1969) (stating that power to issue mandatory preliminary injunction should be
"sparingly exercised") (citations omitted); 0 Malley v. Chrysler Corp., 160 F.2d 35, 36
(7th Cir. 1947) (noting that interlocutory mandatory injunctions are very rarely issued and
only upon "clearest equitable grounds") (citations omitted); and Warner Bros. Pictures
v. Gittone, 110 F.2d 292, 293 (3d Cir. 1940) (observing that preliminary injunctions are
"far-reaching power, never to be indulged in except in a case clearly demanding it") (cita-
tions omitted).
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Consider, for example, the Fifth Circuit's decision in Miami Beach
Federal Savings & Loan Ass 'n v. Callander,20' an explicit predecessor to the
Fifth Circuit decisions cited by the Ninth Circuit in Anderson.2" The Cal-
lander decision relies on an early twentieth-century district court decision in
American Lead Pencil v. Schneegas."3 But American Lead Pencil, in turn,
does not adopt a heightened standard or clear showing requirement. Instead,
it is a relic of the discredited "rule" against mandatory relief. Citing authori-
ties such as Daniell's treatise on Chancery Practice2 and the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court decision in Audenried, °' the American Lead Pencil decision
concludes that "an application for an injunction pendente lite" may not "go
further than to maintain the status quo, and grant what would be, in effect, a
mandatory injunction.t
206
The same historical trail also leads to other authorities that actually
undermine the proposition for which they are cited. Callander relies on the
district court decision in Gamlen Chemical v. Gamlen.Y Instead of suggest-
ing a heightened standard for mandatory orders, however, the Gamlen deci-
sion proposes that any "grant[ ] of a preliminary injunction is an exercise of
a very far reaching power, never to be indulged in except in a case clearly
demanding it. t 208 And although the court in Gamlen adverts to the supposed
rule that "[a] preliminary injunction cannot be mandatory,"2' it does not adopt
(3) Exhibitors Poster Exch., 441 F.2d at 561-62, relies on Congress of RacialEqualitv
v. Douglas, 318 F.2d 95, 97 (5th Cir. 1963) (finding that injunction only should be
ordered when question posed by movant is free from doubt) (citations omitted).
201. 256 F.2d 410 (5th Cir. 1958).
202. See Anderson v. United States, 612F.2d 1112,1114(9th Cir. 1979) (citingExhibi-
tors Poster Exch., 441 F.2d at 561-62 (quoting Callander, 256 F.2d at 415)).
203. 178 F. 735 (N-D. Ga. 1910).
204. Am. Lead Pencil v. Schneegas, 178 F. 735, 738-39 (ND. Ga. 1910) (citing Thomas
v. Hawkins, 20 Ga. 126,134 (1856) (quoting 3 DANIEm, supra note 142, at 343)).
205. Am. Lead Pencil, at 739 (citing McCauley v. Kellogg, 13 Fed. Cas. 1261, 1264-65
(C.C.D. La. 1874) (No 8,688) (citing Audenried v. Phila. & Reading R.R. Co., 68 Pa. 370
(1871))).
206. Id. at 737-39. For another decision in this chain of authority that isto the same effect,
see Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc. v. Gittone, 110 F.2d 292, 293 (3d Cir. 1940) (citing Audenried,
68 Pa. at 370, for proposition that preliminary injunction that "alter[s] the prior status of the
parties fundamentally... may be directed only after a final hearing"). See United States v.
Spectro Foods Corp., 544 F.2d 1175, 1181 n.19 (3d Cir. 1976) (citing WarnerBros., 110 F.2d
at 293, for proposition that "[an] interlocutory mandatory injunction is never appropriate unless
it operates to preserve or restore the status quo."); Anderson v. United States, 612 F.2d 1112,
1114 (9th Cir. 1979) (citing Spectro Foods, 544 F.2d at 1175, for proposition that mandatory
preliminary relief is disfavored).
207. Miami Beach Fed. Sav. &LoanAss'n v. Callander, 256 F.2d 410, 415 (Sth Cir. 1958)
(citing Gamlen Chem. v. Gamlen, 79 F. Supp. 622 (W.D. Pa. 1948)).
208. Gamlen Chem., 79 F. Supp. at 631.
209. Id. (cifingAudenried, 68 Pa. at 375-76).
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a bifurcated standard. Rather, Gamlen announces a general reluctance to issue
any form of preliminary order "except in a case clearly demanding it," and
suggests that the "showing of irreparable injury during the pending [sic] of the
action" is the threshold for all forms of preliminary injunctive relief.21 Other
decisions in this same chain of authority are to the same effect.2 1'
This is not to say that the heightened standard was fashioned out of
whole cloth in SCFC LC and Stanley. The earliest invocation of the standard
may be the Ninth Circuit's decision in Trautwein v. Moreno Mutual Irrigation
Co.,212 another ofthe predecessors to the decisions cited by the Ninth Circuit
in Anderson v. United States.21 In Trautwein, the Ninth Circuit rejected
the supposed rule "that a mandatory injunction will not be issued on an
interlocutory application" as "'against the weight of authority."' 2 4 At the same
time, however, the court suggested that "'mandatory injunctions" are appro-
priate in "extreme cases, where the right is very clear indeed, and where
210. Id. To be sure, the decision also asserts that it "must also appear that the injunction
is required to preserve the status quo," id., but the court's definition of the status quo reveals
that its focus is fixed on irreparable harm. In explaining that "[e]quity will not permit a wrong-
doer to shelter himself behind a suddenly or secretly changed status though he succeeded in
making the change before the chancellor's hand actually reached him," the court emphasizes
that the proper inquiry is irreparable harm, not some arbitrary definition of the status quo. Id.
211. See Toledo, A.A. & N.M Ry. Co. v. Pa. Co., 54 F. 730, 741 (N.D. Ohio 1893) (cited
in Trautwein v. Moreno Mut. Irrigation Co., 22 F.2d 374, 376 (9th Cir. 1927) (cited in
Zugsmith v. Davis, 108 F. Supp. 913, 915 (S.DN.Y. 1952) (cited in Callander, 256 F.2d at
415) (cited in Martinez, 544 F.2d at 1243) (cited in Anderson, 612 F2d at 1114). In Toledo,
the court acknowledged that the usual "office of a preliminary injunction is to preserve the
status quo," but also recognized that historically, mandatory injunctions were issued when
necessary to prevent the "irreparable injury" that might otherwise ensue where "the status quo
is a condition not of rest, but of action." Id. at 741. Thus, Toledo emphasized that irreparable
harm is the controlling inquiry regardless of the form of the order, upholding the issuance of a
mandatory injunction to protect the moving party from suffering ongoing irreparable harm -
"the injury being a continuing one" that required issuance of the mandatory order. Id. at 745;
see also Dorfinn v. Boozer, 414 F.2d 1168, 1173 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (concluding that "power
to issue a preliminary injunction, especially mandatory one, should be 'sparingly exercised,"
but explaining that standard for issuing any "such an injunction" merely requires court to
"balance the damage to both parties') (cited in Spectro Foods, 544 F.2d at 1181 n.19) (cited in
Anderson, 612 F.2d at 1114); Congress of Racial Equality v. Douglas, 318 F.2d 95,97 (5th Cir.
1963) (suggesting generalized reluctance to issue any form of preliminary injunction unless "it
is clear that the question presented by the litigant who seeks the injunction is free from doubt")
(cited in Exhibitors Poster Exchange v. Nat7 Screen Serv. Corp., 441 F.2d 560, 562 (5th Cir.
1971)) (cited inMartinez, 544 F.2d at 1243) (cited inAnderson, 612 F.2d at 1112).
212. 22 F.2d 374 (9th Cir. 1927).
213. See Anderson v. United States, 612 F.2d 1112, 1114-16 (9th Cir. 1979) (citing
Exhibitors, 441 F.2d at 561-62) (quoting Callander, 256 F.2d at 415) (citing Zugsmith v. Davis,
108 F. Supp. 913,915 (S.D. N.Y. 1952) (citing Trautwein, 22 F.2d at 376)).
214. Trautwein v. Moreno Mut Irrigation Co., 22 F.3d 374,376 (9th Cir. 1927) (quoting
32 CoRPus JURIS INJUNC IONS § 7 (1923) (citations omitted)).
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considerations of the relative inconvenience bear strongly in complainant's
favor."
215
The quoted language is from the 1923 edition of Corpus Juris,216 which
seems to have coined the language in an effort to summarizethe various author-
ities cited in its footnotes, including many of the decisions discussed herein,
such as In re Lennon," Pokegama Sugar-Pine Lumber Co. v. Klamath River
Lumber &Improvement Co.,2"" Toledo, A.A. & N.M Railway Co. v. Penn-
sylvania Co., 219 Cole SilverMining Co. v. Virginia & GoldHill Water Co.,
20
Blakemorev. Glamorganshire CanalNavigation Co.,m Herveyv. Smith,mand
others.' Thus, the Ninth and Tenth Circuit's heightened standard is traceable
only to a few relatively recent twentieth-century decisions and to the authors
of the Corpus Juris compendium. The trail of historical authority relied on in
these cases and in Corpus Juris, however, is largely inconsistent with the
heightened standard.
ii. The Historical Trail in the Second Circuit
The Second Circuit's historical chain of authority is even less impressive.
In fact, the Second Circuit's heightened standard appears to be traceable not
to any purportedly longstanding precedent, but to the court's misapplication
of its own decisions.
The court's recent articulations of the heightened standard purportedly
emanate from the Second Circuit's 1977 decision in Jacobson & Co. v. Arm-
strong Cork Co."2 Jacobson, however, cannot withstand the broad reading
attributed to it. True, the court in Jacobson initially suggested "that a differ-
ent standard applies to mandatory injunctions,"' accepting the defendant's
reliance on Clune v. Publishers'Ass 'n of New York Citye6 for this proposi-
215. Id.
216. 32 CORPUS JURIS INJUNCTIONS § 7 (1923).
217. See discussion supra note 181-83 and accompanying text.
218. 86 F. 528 (ND. CaL 1898), discussed supra note 184 and accompanying text.
219. 54 F. 730 (ND. Ohio 1893), discussed supra note 191 and accompanying text.
220. 6 F. Cas. 72 (D. Nev. 1871) (No. 2,990), discussed supra notes 184-87 and accompa-
nying text.
221. 39 Eng. Rep. 639 (Ch. 1832), discussed supra notes 145-50 and accompanying text
222. 69 Eng. Rep. 510 (V.C. 1855), discussed supranotes 155-60 and accompanyingtext.
223. See 32 CORPUs JuRIs INxUNCIiONS § 7 (1923) (citing cases).
224. 548 F.2d 438,441 (2d Cir. 1977) (applying heightened standard to mandatory injunc-
tions) (cited in Tom DohertyAssoes., Inc. v. Saban Ente't, Inc., 60 F3d 27,34 (2d Cir. 1995);
Abdul Wali v. Coughlin, 754 F.2d 1015,1025 (2d Cir. 1985)).
225. Jacobson & Co. v. Armstrong Cork Co., 548 F.2d 438,441 (2d Cir. 1977).
226. 214 F. Supp. 520, 531 (S.D.N.Y.), afd on the opinion below, 314 F.2d 343 (2d Cir.
1963).
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tion.2 7 But the Jacobson court never suggested that this "different standard"
incorporated the current notion of a "clear showing that the moving party is
entitled to the relief requested," or that "extreme or very serious damage will
result from a denial of preliminary relief."' To the contrary, Jacobson
applied the traditional preliminary injunction standard in alIrming the order
in that case.'
The plaintiff in Jacobson was a distributor of acoustical ceiling systems
who sought a preliminary injunction requiring the defendant manufacturer of
those systems to resume selling its products to the plaintiff.' ° The district
court granted plaintiff's motion, finding that "while plaintiff had not made a
compelling case of probable success on the merits" of its antitrust claims, "it
had shown sufficiently serious questions going to the merits to make them a
fair ground for litigation...21 In the district court's view, this finding was
sufficient to sustain the injunction - when "coupled with the court's finding
that the potential hardship to [Plaintif] outweighed any inconvenience that
[Defendant] might suffer as a result of an injunction." 2
The Second Circuit affirmed. Although it had vaguely suggested that a
"different standard" applied to mandatory orders, the Jacobson court upheld
the injunction in that case under the traditional preliminary injunction formu-
lation. First, the court rejected the defendant's argument that the Clune
requirement of a showing of "extreme or very serious damage" required
reversal. m3 Although the district court had not made a finding under this
standard, the Jacobson court consciously looked the other way, explicitly
rejecting the argument "that satisfaction of the Clune standard is... a sine
qua non for obtaining a mandatory preliminary injunction." 4 It concluded
"that 'irreparable harm' is indistinguishable from 'extreme or very serious
damage,' 23 5 and explained that both standards merely reaffirm the "taditional
227. Clune v. Publishers' Ass'n of New York City, 214 F. Supp. 520 (S.D.N.Y 1963).
Clune itself is the end of the line for the Second Circuit's historical chain of authority. Al-
though the opinion says that the differential treatment of mandatory orders is "well known," the
court offers no authority at all for its conclusions. Id. at 531. Thus, Clune adds nothing to the
historical pedigree of the Second Circuit's heightened standard.
228. Tom DohertyAssocs., 60 F.3d at 34 (quotingAbdul Waft, 754 F.2d at 1025).
229. Jacobson, 548 F.2d at441.
230. Id. at440.
231. Id. at 440-41 (citing Sonesta Int'l Hotels Corp. v. Willington Assocs., 483 F.2d 247
(2d Cir. 1973)).
232. Id. at 441.
233. Id.
234. Id. at 441 n.3.
235. Id. At least one subsequent Second Circuit decision has read Jacobson to stand for
this narrow proposition - that "extreme hardship" is to be equated with irreparable injury. See
Nassau Boulevard Shell Sere. Station, Inc. v. Shell Oil Co., 875 F.2d 359, 363 (2d Cir. 1989).
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reluctance" to preliminary injunctive relief "in doubtful cases or where the
injury complained of is capable of compensation in damages. '"I'
Second, the Jacobson court also rejected the defendant's argument that
the applicable standard required the district court to find a strong "likelihood
of success on the merits.' 7 After reviewing Second Circuit precedents (none
of which, incidentally, purported to draw any substantive distinction between
mandatory and prohibitory orders), the Jacobson court concluded that the
applicable standard "require[d] no more than a showing of 'sufficiently serious
questions going to the merits to make them a fair ground for litigation,"' so
long as the plaintiff also made "a sufficient showing of irreparable injury."u
238
Under this standard, Jacobson affirmed the mandatory order requiring the
defendant to resume supplying its products to plaintiff, holding that there were
serious questions on the merits and that the "balance of hardships" tipped
decidedly in the plaintiffs favor. 9
Thus, Jacobson does not support a heightened standard for mandatory
injunctions. Despite the puzzling rhetoric accepting the defendant's reliance
on the Clune case for the general proposition that "a different standard applies
to mandatory injunctions," the substance ofthe Jacobson decision affirms that
the traditional formulation applies. Indeed, the Jacobson court expressly
rejected both prongs of the heightened standard currently in vogue in the
Second Circuit - first concluding that the "extreme or very serious damage"
formulation is "indistinguishable" from the traditional showing of "irreparable
harm, 2 40 and then refusing to impose a heightened showing of a clear likeli-
hood of success on the merits.241
B. Analytical Foundations of the Preliminary Injunction Standard
Although the traditional formulation of the preliminary injunction stan-
dard dates to the nineteenth century, courts did not clearly articulate the sub-
stantive policy basis ofthe standard until quite recently. For many years, the
courts exercised their discretion to issue preliminary relief under an undefined
236. Jacobson & Co. v. Armstrong Cork Co., 548 F.2d 438, 441-42 n.3 (2d Cir. 1977)
(quoting Clune v. Publishers' Ass'n of New York City, 214 F. Supp. 520, 531 (S.D.N.Y.
1963)).
237. See id. at 442-43 (rejecting defendant's argument in favor of "serious questions going
to the merits" standard).
238. Id. at 443 (quoting Sonesta Int'l Hotels Corp. v. Wdlington Assocs., 483 F.2d 247,
250 (2d Cir. 1973)).
239. Id. at 445 (finding that plaintiff's "loss of good will and customers" could not be "recti-
fied by monetary damages" and that defendant's only injury - "that which arises from being
compelled to sell to a distributor against its will" - was "insignificant" by comparison).
240. Id. at441 n.3.
241. See id. at 442-43 (requiring no showing of probable success on merits).
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"balance" of the four traditional factors, without any substantial explanation
of the policy behind the standard.242 Academic commentary was similarly
silent.
1. The Economic Model
The pathbreaking commentary came in Professor John Leubsdorf's Harv-
ardLaw Review piece in 1978.243 After canvassing some ofthe history behind
the courts' current preliminary injunction standards, Professor Leubsdorfsug-
gested a "model" that purported to capture the policy considerations at stake
at the preliminary injunction stage in accordance with "much, but not all, of
the received learning on preliminary relief."'  Under Leubsdorf's model, the
purpose of a preIminary injunction is "to minimize the probable irreparable
loss of rights caused by errors incident to hasty decision.""24 In other words:
A court considering a motion for interlocutory relief faces a dilemma. If it
does not grant prompt relief; the plaintiff may suffer a loss of his lawful
rights that no later remedy can restore. But ifthe court does grantimmedi-
ate relief; the defendant may sustainpreciselythe same loss of his rights.2
As Leubsdorf explained, the source of this "dilemma" is uncertainty.
Because "the court's interlocutory assessment of the parties' underlying rights
is fallible in the sense that it may be different from the decision that ultimately
will be reached," Leubsdorf noted that any decision the court makes on a
preliminary injunction motion presents some risk of irreparable harm.24'
Thus, the key insight of Leubsdorfs model is that the court's decision
whether to grant a preliminary injunction involves a tradeoff between two
predicted costs: the irreparable harms that would be suffered by the moving
party if the injunction were erroneously denied, and the irreparable harms that
would be suffered by the non-moving party if the injunction were erroneously
entered. According to Leubsdorf, the purpose of the preliminary injunction
standard is to direct the court to "[w]hichever course promises the smaller
probable loss.24
242. For a precise identification of the various analytical holes left by the courts, see
Audain, supra note 4, at 1233-45.
243. See generallv Leubsdorf, supra note 4 (proposing model for preliminary injunction
cases).
244. Id. at 541.
245. Id.
246. Id.
247. See id. (noting that this is true "[w]hen irreparable harm to legal rights on both sides
is possible").
248. Id. at 542.
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Leubsdorf further posited that the standard factors applied by the courts
can be understood within the confines of this model. First, the courts' focus
on the "irreparable harm" anticipated by the parties draws an important
distinction between injuries that can be redressed at final judgment and those
that cannot. The court should consider only the latter:
The court need not consider every harm resulting from an erroneous pre-
liminary decision, but only the harm that final relief cannot redress. If the
final judgment can remedy the plaintiff's injuries, there is no occasion to
grant immediate protection which may turn out to have been based on
error. Likewise, if the defendant's injuries from what turns out to be an
erroneous injunction can be redressed later, there is no reason to deny
interim relief otherwise warranted. 9
Second, the moving party's likelihood of success on the merits "is the key
to the analysis of interlocutory relief.".20 The model suggests that the court's
prediction of the likelihood of success on the merits should be used to weigh
the expected irreparable harms to the two parties:
The court, in theory, should assess the probable irreparable loss of rights
an injunction would causebymultiplyingtheprobability thatthe defendant
will prevail by the amount of the irreparable loss thatthe defendant would
suffer if enjoined from exercising what turns out to be his legal right. .It
should then make a similar calculation of the probable irreparable loss of
rights to the plaintiff from denying the injunction.Y'
In sum, the Leubsdorf model suggests that the decision whether to enter
a preliminary injunction should favor "the course likely to inflict the smallest
probable irreparable loss ofrights."' 2 The court's assessment of which course
accomplishes this goal depends on a determination of "the likelihood that
various views ofthe facts and the law will prevail at trial" and of "the probable
loss of rights to each party if it acts on a view of the merits that proves to be
erroneous." 1 3 As Leubsdorf conceded understatedly, "reducing this model to
hard figures is usually impractical."" Yet "mathematical expectations of
profit or loss are familiar tools in decisionmaking theory," and Leubsdorf
asserted that the model provides a more concrete analytical structure for the
decision whether to grant a preliminary injunction even if it does not offer an
objective solution based on "hard figures."
249. Id. at 541.
250. Id.
251. Id. at 542 (footnote omitted).
252. Id. at541.
253. Id.
254. Id. at 542.
58 WASH. &LEE L. REV 109 (2001)
Leubsdorf's model was embraced and amplified by Richard Posner, now
Chief Judge of the Seventh Circuit and one of several who may lay claim to
the title of father of the law and economics movement. Judge Posner first
adopted a variant of Leubsdorf's model in a Seventh Circuit opinion, and
subsequently refined it in his treatise on Economic Analysis of Law."5 In
American Hospital Supply v. Hospital Products, Ltd.," 6 Judge Posner ex-
plained that "[a] district judge asked to decide whether to grant or deny a
preliminary injunction must choose the course of action that will minimize the
costs ofbeingmistaken." 7 Like Leubsdorf, Posner concluded that the court's
prediction of the likelihood of success could be understood as a mechanism
for "weighting" the expected irreparable harms. Posner formalized the model
by suggesting that the trial court's decision is governed by "a simple formula":
Grant the preliminaryinjunction ffbut only ffP xH-I9 > (1 - P) x H, or, in
words, only ff the harm to the plaintiff ff the injunction is denied, multi-
plied by the probability that the denial would be an error... exceeds the
harm to the defendant ffthe injunction is granted, multipliedby the proba-
bility that granting the injunction would be an error. That probability is
simply one minus the probabilitythattheplaintiffwill win attrial; forifthe
plaintiffhas, say, a 40 percent chance of winning, the defendant must have
a 60 percent chance ofwinning (1.00 -.40 = .60). The left-hand side ofthe
formula is simply the probability of an erroneous denial weighted by the
cost of denial to the plaintiffK and the right-hand side simplytheprobability
of an erroneous grant weighted by the cost of grant to the defendant'
Like Leubsdorf before him, Posner offered a preemptive response to his
expected critics (andto Judge Swygert's biting dissent).259 Specifically, Posner
explained that his "formula" was "not offered as anew legal standard," and was
not intended "to force analysis into a quantitative straitjacket. 1260 Admittedly,
255. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSis OF LAW 605-06 (5th ed. 1998)
(proposing formula to balance harm to parties with risk of error).
256. 780 F.2d 589 (7th Cir. 1986).
257. Am. Hosp. Supply v. Hosp. Prods., Ltd., 780 F.2d 589, 593 (7th Cir. 1986). Judge
Posner articulated this intuitive explanation, but not the formal model that followed, in an
earlier opinion. See Roland Mach. Co. v. Dresser Inds., 749 F2d 380, 388 (7th Cir. 1984)
(stating that "task for the district judge ... is to minimize errors").
258. Am. Hosp. Supply., 780 F.2d at 603; see also POSNER, supra note 255, at 605-06
(explaining formula for whether to grant or deny preliminary injunction).
259. Am. Hosp. Supply, 780 F.2d at 609-10 (Swygert, J., dissenting) (asserting that essen-
tial role of judge in preliminary injunction process is to "rely on [his] own judgment, not on
mathematical quanta" and that litigating attorneys cannot be expected to "dust off their calcu-
lators and dress their arguments in quantitative clothing").
260. Id. at 593. In a sense, both Leubsdorf and Posner understate this point The model
is not only not "intended" to "force analysis into a quantitative straitjacket"; analytically,
quantification of the expected irreparable harms is logically untenable. Because courts define
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the evidence presented to the court will not facilitate an objective calculation
of the numerical values called for in the formula. Instead, Posner explained
that the formula is intended as "a distillation ofthe familiar four.., factor test
that courts use in deciding whether to grant a preliminary injunction."'
2. The Triumph of the Economic Model
The economic model was hardly accepted with open arms by the acad-
emy. Despite Leubsdorf's and Posner's disclaimers to the contrary, Professor
Linda Mullenix dismissed the economic model as calling for an "econometric
methodology" involving an impossible "quantification of an unquantifiable
process." 22 Professor Linda Silberman similarly proposed to discard the
economic approach on the ground that "[b]oth probability of success and
harms to plaintiff and defendant are highly complex assessments, not reduc-
ible to a simple numerical measurement."'263 The headline of a Legal Times
article reflected the same skepticism: "You Say You Want an Injunction?
Practice Your Math."2 '
Professor Mullenix's reaction was especially acerbic. She insisted that
"Judge Posner's formula replaces vague, discretionary, equitable assessments
with quantifiable verities" of"mathematical precision," to the extent that tradi-
tional equitable balancing could be swept aside as "an untidy anachronism1
265
and '"judges could be dispensed with altogether."121 In Mullenix's view, in
other words, the economic model is "disingenuous" in obscuring subjectivity
"in the complexities of algebraic babble,"267 and even "paradoxical[ I" and
harm irreparable harm as harm that cannot be remedied by an award of money damages, any
effort to place a dollar value on such harms will necessarily fail. Thus, the economic model's
triumph is that it provides analytical structure for an evaluation of the traditional factors applied
by the courts. It disciplines the court to ask the right questions, but it does not and cannot
purport to provide quantitative answers.
261. Id.
262. See Linda S. Mullenix, Burying (With Kindness) the Felicific Calculus of Civil
Procedure, 40 VAND. L. REV. 541, 543-544 & 548 (1987) (criticizing Judge Posuer's formula
as "an abomination in theory and practice").
263. Linda J. SilbermanInjunctions by the Numbers: Less Than the Sum oflts Parts, 63
CHL-KENT L. REV. 279,306 (1987).
264. See W. John Moore, You Say You Want an Injunction? Practice Your Math, LEGAL
TIMES, Mar. 17, 1986, at I (noting that critics of Posner's approach argue that "it is very mis-
leading to suggest that a preliminary injunction effort can be reduced to a numbers game"). Not
all of the commentaries were critical; one article compared Judge Posner to Isaac Newton, con-
cluding that "Judge Richard Posner would certainly have made Sir Isaac Newton proud were
Newton alive today." Audain, supra note 4, at 1218.
265. Mullenix, supra note 262, at 550.
266. Id. at 570.
267. Id.
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"ironic[ ]" in requiring "counsel and judges to do precisely the opposite of
what equity demands - quantify the litigant's injuries and harms.o
2
6
Despite the academy's caustic reaction, I submit that the economic model
proposed by Leubsdorf and refined by Posner has since emerged as the
triumphant, dominant theory of preliminary injunctions. First, it is important
to understand that the above critiques imply a false dichotomy. Despite the
rhetoric employed by Professor Mullenix, the choice between the economic
model and the "traditional" equitable formulation is not a choice between
"subjectivity" and "mathematical precision." Leubsdorf and Posner can (and
should) be taken at their word; their model's utility does not depend on quan-
tification of irreparable harms or probabilities of success. It properly assumes
that any estimate of such variables will quickly devolve into a subjective con-
ceptualization.
But this assumption does not deprive the model of its utility.2 69 Instead,
it merely clarifies that the model's utility lies not in an unrealistic expectation
of mathematical quantification, but in its "distillation" of a "positive" eco-
nomic rationale for the traditional formulation - a theoretical framework for
evaluating the court's exercise of its discretion in considering the traditional
four factors.
Thus, the true choice presented by the economic model is not whether to
abandon subjective, equitable discretion, but whether such discretion should
be guided by an overarching principle, or left to the whim of the court. In
other words, the criticism that the economic model requires subjective value
judgments that cannot be reduced to objective, quantifiable numbers is accu-
rate, but beside the point. Such value judgments must be made regardless of
whether or not one embraces the economic model. The difference, then, is
that the economic model explains why such value judgments matter. Without
some overarching theoretical construct, judges are left to make such judg-
ments according to their own capricious standards - which are no standards
at ally
0
268. Id. at 550.
269. See Thomas R. Lee, Stare Decis in Economic Perspective: An Economic Analys
ofthe Supreme Court's Doctrine ofPrecedent, 78 N.C. L. REV. 643, 705-06 (2000) (arguing that
failure of economic model to provide "objective, universal answers ... should be neither
surprising nor fatal to the model's utility," in that primary role of economic analysis is not to
"yield an objectively verifiable answer," but to "facilitate a debate that extends beyond ... empty
rhetoric"); Silberman, supra note 263, at 304 (arguing that "unless the symbolic formulation of
P x I- > (1 - P) x Id clarifies or enhances for lawyers and judges the decision ofwhether to grant
a preliminary injunction, there is no need to bother" (citing Am. Hosp. Supply v. Hosp. Prods.
Ltd., 780 F.2d 589, 609 (7th Cir. 1986) (Swygert, J., dissenting) (asserting that if mathematical
formula is "merely a distillation ofthe traditional four-prong test," then "why bother?"))).
270. Perhaps this approach is preferable to some, because they believe that the subtle
equities presented to courts on preliminary injunction motions can never be reduced to any
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A more satisfactory objection to the economic model would be to ques-
tion its theoretical construct - to argue that minimization of irreparable error
costs is not a legitimate goal, or that another goal is more significant. But the
critics of the model have made no attempt at such a criticism. Professor
Douglas Laycock has expressed some skepticism as to the economic model's
utility, but nevertheless has acknowledged that "Posner and Leubsdorf focus
attention on the right question"" and that their model "is a helpful distillation
in one important way it focuses attention on the point of the balancing
process and specifies the relationship among the factors to be balanced."11
2
Professor Silberman similarly has objected that the expressions in the model
are "not reducible to a simple numerical measurement," but nevertheless has
conceded that the model "helps to conceptualize the notion of relativity
between harm to the parties and likelihood of success." 3
It is in this sense that the economic model has emerged triumphant. It
has provided the dominant conceptual framework for ordering and balancing
the traditional factors considered by the courts at the preliminary injunction
phase. The model is dominant in the sense acknowledged by Professor Lay-
cock: It focuses the courts "on the right question" and thereby explains the
conceptual relationship between the traditional factors. The model's detrac-
tors do not dispute this important contribution, nor have courts or commenta-
tors offered any competing framework.
Most importantly, the triumph of the economic model is evident in the
current case law in the federal courts. When Leubsdorf and Posner examined
the cases, they identified a number ofpoints on whichthe courts failed to reach
a consensus. Perhaps the most fundamental disagreement they identified
concerned the relationship between the showing of likelihood of success and
the moving party's irreparable harm. Some courts suggested that a showing of
standards, and thus the best results will be ensured by preserving boundless discretion. See John
Choon Yoo, Who Measures the Chancellor's Foot? The Inherent RemedialAuthority of the
Federal Courts, 84 CAL. L. REV. 1121,1136 (1996) (offering originalist, historical response to
notion that judicial power encompasses role of expressing societal values not embodied in
specific legal tats). But one should not be confused into thinking that an inability to divine
quantifiable probabilities and harms necessarily dictates this result
271. DOUGLASLAYCOCK,MODERNAMEmICANREMEIESCA55AND MATmuALS 424(2d
ed. 1994) (querying whether "the court's goal" should be "to minimize the risk of legally un-
justified irreparable harm, recognizing that the balancing of risks must inevitably be verbal and
imprecise," and challenging thoughtful student to "formulate a better one").
272. DOUGLASLAYCOCK, TEDEATHOFTHEIPF PARABLEIN'JUYRUIE 120(1991). But
see id. (cautioning that model is "a misleading distillation in another way" in that it "greatly
oversimplifies the variables that go into the balance" and in that "variables cannot be conceptu-
alized even in theory as having discrete values that could be represented by points on a graph
or by single numbers in an equation").
273. Silberman, supra note 263, at 306. But see id. at 307 (concluding that economic
"formula... is one that equals less than the sum of its parts and is of no utility").
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likely success was a threshold requirementP4 ; others rejected that notion and
favored a "sliding scale" approach. 5 Without a conceptual framework for
evaluating this relationship, the courts' disagreement on this issue was left to
flounder.
The most important triumph ofthe economic model has been its apparent
ability to unifythe courts' treatment of this issue. Only a few courts explicitly
have adverted to the economic framework," 6 but many others implicitly have
adopted its fundamental premise in announcing the overarching goal of
minimizing the irreparable harms that might ensue in the event that the
preliminary decision turns out to be erroneous. 277 And whereas the courts
previously were in substantial disarray as to the propriety of a "sliding scale"
under which a stronger showing of irreparable harm could compensate for a
274. See Roland Mach. Co. v. Dresser Indus., 749 F.2d 380, 383 (7th Cir. 1984) (indicat-
ing, in opinion by Judge Posner, that some cases suggest that plaintiff must make threshold
showing on all four traditional factors); Leubsdorf, supra note 4, at 526 (noting that "[o]ne line
of cases requires plaintiffs to show a fair question on the merits, another a substantial probabil-
ity of success, another a reasonable certainty, and another a clear right," without any theoretical
"explanation for choosing one instead of another") (footnotes omitted).
275. See RolandMach., 749 F.2d at 383 (noting that some cases do not require plaintiff
to prevail on all four factors).
276. See, e.g., Standard Havens Prods., Inc. v. Gencor Indus., Inc., 897 F.2d 511, 513
(Fed. Cir. 1990) ("The more likely the plaintiff is to win, the less heavily need the balance of
harms weigh in his favor, the less likely he is to win, the more need it weigh in his favor.")
(quoting RolandMach., 749 F.2d at 387-88)); Sierra On-Line, Inc. v. Phoenix Software, Inc.,
739 F.2d 1415, 1422 (9th Cir. 1984) (citing Leubsdorf for proposition that preliminary injunc-
tion standard requires district judge "to exercise[ ] his discretion in such a way as to minimize
the risk that a litigant will suffer an irreparable loss of legal rights in the period before final
resolution of the dispute"); Am. Elec. v. Singarayar, 530 So. 2d 1319, 1324 (Miss. 1988)
(adopting Judge Posner's approach in suggesting that court should "undertake[ ] these inquires
to help it figure out whether granting the injunction would be the error-minimizing course of
action, which depends on the probability that the plaintiff is in the right and on the costs to the
plaintiff, the defendant, or others of granting or denying the injunction." (quoting Am. Hosp.
Supply Corp. v. Hosp. Prods., Ltd., 780 F.2d 589, 593-94 (7th Cir. 1986)).
277. See Cont'l Group, Inc. vAmoco Chems. Corp., 614 F2d 351,357 n.9 (3d Cir. 1980)
("If the final judgment can remedy the plaintiff's injuries, there is no occasion to grant
immediate protection which may tum out to have been based on error. Likewise, if the
defendant's injuries from what turns out to be an erroneous injunction can be redressed later,
there is no reason to deny interim relief otherwise warranted." (quoting Luebsdorf, supra note
4, at 541)); see also EEOC v. Astra USA, Inc., 94 F. 3d 738,743 (1st Cir. 1996) ("In determin-
ing whether the district court was justified in finding a significant risk of irreparable harm, we
first note that when the likelihood of success on the merits is great, a movant can show
somewhat less in the way of irreparable harm and still gamer preliminary injunctive relief.");
Constructors Assoc. of W. Pa. v. Kreps, 573 F.2d 811, 815 (3d Cir. 1978) ("On the basis of
the data before it, the district court must attempt to minimize the probable harm to legally
protected interests between the time that the motion for a preliminary injunction is filed and
the time of the final hearing.").
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lesser likelihood of success, the courts today overwhelmingly (if not unani-
mously) have adopted such an approach. 8
Perhaps the timing of this doctrinal unification does not alone suggest
that credit is due to the economic model. But in my view, the influence of
Leubsdorf and Posner is evident not only in the post hoc timing ofthe courts'
holdings, but also in the conceptual consensus that is now prevalent in the
courts' opinions, and in the fact that the conceptual goal mapped out by
Leubsdorf and refined by Posner finds almost no detractors or competitors in
the academy or in federal jurisprudence.
3. The Status Quo Under the Economic Model
This background sets the stage for a conceptual evaluation of the proper
role of the "status quo" inthe preliminary injunction standard. If the goal of
a prelininary injunction is to minimize irreparable harm to the parties,
weighted by the court's prediction of the proper outcome on the merits, what
is the proper role of the status quo?
a. The Status Quo as a Proxy for Irreparable Harm?
It might be argued that the bifurcated status quo standard makes eco-
nomic sense inthat injunctions that preserve the status quo predictably impose
relatively minimal hardships on non-moving parties, whereas injunctions that
278. See supra note 7. Moore's Federal Practice asserts that the consensus on this point
is less than universal. Specifically, the treatise concludes that the First, Fifth, and Eleventh Cir-
cuits have r jected some variation of the "sliding scale" approach. See 13 JAMES WM. MooRE,
ET AL., MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 65.22[5][a], at 65-57 (asserting that "[t]he First Circuit
has rejected the 'alternative test' . . under which likelihood of success on the merits need not
be shown if other factors (e.g., potential harm to the plaintiff and lack of potential harm to the
defendant) are strong"); id. § 65.225][e], at 65-64 (concluding that under Fifth Circuit law, "[a]
weakness in proof on one of the four factors may not be remedied by demonstrating correspond-
ing strength in another"); id. § 65.22[5][k], at 65-72 (suggesting that "the Eleventh Circuit has
refused to adopt the Second Circuit's more liberal approach"). The cases cited in support of
these conclusions, however, do not expressly reject the notion of a sliding scale, they merely
indicate that the moving party bears the burden of establishing all four of the traditional factors.
See, e.g., Cherokee Pump & Equip., Inc. v. Aurora Pump, 38 F.3d 246, 249 (5th Cir. 1994)
(observing that moving party has "burden of persuasion" on all four factors); NLRB v. Sullivan
Bros. Printers, Inc., 38 F3d 58, 67 (1st Cir. 1994) (stating that moving party bears burden of
establishing "a clear likelihood of success"); Nnadi v. Richter, 976 F.2d 682, 690 (11th Cir.
1993) (noting that moving party "bore the burden of proving each of these four factors").
Moreover, as noted above, other decisions in each of these circuits expressly adopt some notion
of a sliding scale. Thus, the better reading of the cases is that although the moving party bears
the burden on all four factors, that party's burden on individual factors may vary depending on
the strength of the showing on other factors. This is the only reading that preserves all of the
cited cases, which have not been overruled and thus should be read to be consistent with each
other wherever possible.
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upset the status quo tend to impose relatively significant hardships on non-
moving parties. This rationale is arguably consistent with the historical origins
of the courts' discussion ofthe status quo, which was inextricably intertwined
in the goal of avoiding irreparable harm 9
Consider, for example, some of the injunctions recently upheld in the cir-
cuits that accord doctrinal status to the status quo, such as an order enjoining
a defendant's solicitation of his former employer's employees or clients in
alleged violation of an employment contraot, ° an order enjoining a defen-
dant's use of a trademark that allegedly infiinges or dilutes a plaintiff's
mark," or an order staying enforcement of a new statutory restriction on the
number of suspensions on deportations issuable by the Immigration and
Naturalization Service (INS) in any single year.' Preservation ofthe "status
quo" in these instances is consistent with the goal of minimizing irreparable
harms. Breach of a non-solicitation agreement produces irreparable harm in
the form of "loss of customers as well as customer goodwill," while enforce-
ment of such a provision against an employee does not interfere from his
"pursuing a livelihood in his chosen profession."' Alleged trademark
dilution and infringement pose a similar balance of hardships skewed in
plaintiffs favor, as trademark holders may suffer irreparable injury to 'their
reputation with their corporate customers and partners, as well as the public
at large," whereas defendants will be deprived only of their ill-gotten (and
compensable) profits."' Finally, the harm to the plaintiffs seeking to stay
enforcement ofthe statutory cap on the INS's suspensions of deportations was
279. See discussion infra notes 251-59 and accompanying text
280. See Am. Fid. Assurance Corp. v. Leonard, 81 F. Supp. 2d 1115,1115 (D. Kan. 2000)
(granting preliminary injunction because harm to employer outweighed injury to employee).
281. See, e.g, NBA Props. v. Untertainment Records LLC, No. 99 Civ. 2933, 1999 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 7780, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. May 25, 1999) (affirming preliminary injunction against
defendant's use of NBA logo "show[ing] a silhouetted basketball player dribbling a basket-
ball ... altered to put a handgun in one hand alongside the words 'SDE SPORTS, DRUGS, &
ENTERTAINMENT'").
282. See Barahona-Gomez v. Reno, 167 F3d 1228,1238 (9th Cir. 1999) (affirming district
court's preliminary injunction against enforcement of annual limit on suspensions of deportation
imposed under Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996).
283. Am.Fid.,81F.Supp.2datll2l.
284. NBA Props., 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7780, at *23. Although the NBA Properties
court affirmed the prohibitory injunction against the defendant's use of the NBA logo, it refused
to endorse a mandatory injunction in the form of a "recall order" requiring defendant to recall
magazines already issued with the allegedly infringing advertisement Id. at *31-*35. In so
doing, the court reinforced the controlling role of the balance of hardships. It held that "the
balance of hardships with respect to the recall relief.., tips decidedly in favor of the defen-
dant," because "it would be extremely difficult... perhaps a practical impossibility, to recall
[the advertisement] from the remaining copies of [the magazine] that have found their way onto
newsstands around the country." Id. at *34.
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heroically irreparable: Ifthe cap were enforced, the record indicated that one
the plaintiffs would have been deported and forever deprived of any "opportu-
nity to seek review" of his request for suspension of deportation, and as a
result the plaintiff would have lost life-saving cancer treatment not available
if he were deported to Nicaragua."s Any harmto the government, by contrast,
was deemed to be "minimal" at best."s Accordingly, under these circum-
stances, the courts properly have held that entry of a preliminary injunction
is proper and need not be supported by any heightened showing of a "strong"
likelihood of success on the merits.'
These results arguably can be justified in terms of the economic model.
If an injunction preserving the status quo prevents substantial irreparable harm
to the moving party, but imposes little or no such burden on the non-moving
party, then entry of the injunction will minimize expected irreparable harms
even without a showing that the moving party is highly likely to succeed on the
merits. Interms ofthe formal model, as the ratio of Hp /Hd approaches infinity
(i.e., as H increases and/or Id approaches zero), the preliminary injunction
will advance the goal of minimizing irreparable harm so long as the moving
party has some conceivable chance of success on the merits (so long as P > 0).
In plainer English, a preliminary injunction preserving the status quo
arguably minimizes irreparable harms even if the court ultimately is more likely
to conclude that the injunction is unjustified on the merits. To see why, com-
pare the two possible scenarios under which the court makes an error (and thus
imposes irreparable harm on one of the parties). Under the first, the court
grants the preliminary injunction, but eventually finds that the moving party's
claim fails on the merits. Although the injunction was in error, it has not
imposed appreciable irreparable harms, since (by our assumption) the mere
preservation of the status quo will not have harmed the non-moving party ina
way that cannot be remedied on final judgment (e.g., by an award under the
bond posted by the moving party pursuant to Federal Rule 65). Under the
second scenario, the court denies the preliminary injunction, but eventually
concludes that the moving party is entitled to injunctive relief. Here, the
285. See Barahona-Gomez, 167 F.3d at 1236 (discussing hardships facing plaintiffs
seeking injunction).
286. See id. at 1237 (noting relatively small cost to Government were it wrongfiuly
enjoined).
287. See id. at 1235-36 (affirming injunction on ground that plaintiffs had "raised serious
questions" as to whether statutory cap on suspensions of deportations was unconstitutional or
in violation of Administrative Procedure Act); Am. Fid. Assurance Corp. v. Leonard, 81 F.
Supp. 2d 1115,1121 (D. Kan. 2000) (upholding injunction on basis of"a reasonable probability
of success on the merits"); NBA Props. v. Untertainment Records LLC, No. 99 Civ. 2933,1999
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7780, at *15 (S.D.N.Y. May 25, 1999) (explaining that showing of "serious
questions going to the merits" is sufficient where balance of hardships tips decidedly in moving
party's favor).
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court's erroneous ruling at the preliminary phase has imposed substantial
irreparable injury because the court's failure to preserve the status quo has
imposed harms on the moving party that cannot be remedied by a final judg-
ment of monetary damages (e.g., because those harns cannot reliably be
quantified). The economic model tells us that the first scenario is the lesser of
two evils - even if it is statistically more likely to materialize - because the
second scenario presents meaningful irreparable harms, while the first does not.
The heightened standard for preliminary injunctions upsetting the status
quo arguably might be justified under a converse application of the economic
model. Consider two of the injunctions discussed in Part I: one requiring
Visa to issue 1.5 million Visa credit cards to the moving party, and another
requiring USC to rehire its former women's basketball coach at the higher
salary it pays to its men's coach. Entry of these injunctions would tend to
impose substantial irreparable harm on the defendant, but would not prevent
any appreciable irreparable injuries to the plaintiff.
Indeed, in each case, the respective court's refusal to endorse preliminary
relief turned on just this sort of analysis. In SCFC LC, the Tenth Circuit
explained that the plaintiff had offered only "speculation" as to its expected
harm (which in any event would be remedied by a potential award of treble
damages at final judgment), whereas Visa had demonstrated prototypically
irreparable injury in the form ofunquantifiable harm to the "good will" associ-
ated with its trademark. 8 In Stanley, the Ninth Circuit similarly concluded
that the plaintiffhad "failed to show that the injury she suffered was caused by
the alleged wrongful conduct of USC," while the University had shown that it
would suffer irreparable harm because a requirement to hire a "dissatisfied"
coach would "affect the ability of the school to recruit athletes concerned about
the quality and identity of the coaching staff for the next four years. '
Again, this approach arguably can be explained in terms ofthe economic
model. If an injunction upsetting the status quo prevents no appreciable
irreparable harm to the moving party, but imposes a substantial irreparable
burden on the non-moving party, then entry of the injunction will minimize
expected irreparable harms only upon a showing that the moving party is
highly likely to succeed on the merits. In terms of the formal model, as the
ratio of H. / Hd approaches zero (i.e., as H. approaches zero and/or Hd ap-
proaches infinity), the preliminary injunction will advance the goal of mini-
mizing irreparable harm only if the moving party is almost certain to succeed
on the merits (i.e., as P approaches 1).
This point may also be phrased in plainer English. Consider again the two
scenarios under which the court may make an error (and thus impose irrepara-
288. SCFC ILC, Inc. v. VISA USA, Inc., 936 F.2d 1096,1100-01 (10th Cir. 1991).
289. Stanley v. Univ. of S. Cal., 13 F.3d 1313, 1325 (9th Cir. 1994).
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ble harm on one ofthe parties). The first type of error (entry of a preliminary
injunction that turns out to be erroneous) would give rise to substantial irrepa-
rable harms, since (by our assumption) altering the status quo will harm the
non-moving party in a way that cannot be remedied on final judgment. The
second (refusal to enter a preliminary injunction that turns out to have been
warranted), by contrast, would not create appreciable irreparable harms, since
the court's failure to upset the status quo will not impose harms on the moving
party that cannot be remedied by a final judgment of monetary damages. All
things being equal, the economic model tells us that the second scenario is the
lesser of two evils. In other words, the more significant irreparable harms
anticipated under the first scenario suggest that the preliminary injunction
should be granted only if the greater magnitude of those harms is sufficiently
discounted by the moving party's strong likelihood of success on the merits.
In sum, the prevailing theory of the conceptual role of preliminary injunc-
tions suggests a possible justification of the bifurcated "status quo" standard.
Under this theory, the "status quo" operates as a proxy for the courts' evalua-
tion of the balance of hardships. A preliminary injunction that preserves the
status quo may be justified on a minimal showing of likely success on the
merits because the balance of hardships tends to favor the moving party,
whereas a preliminary injunction that upsets the status quo requires a strong
showing of likely success on the merits because the balance of hardships tends
to favor the non-moving party. If the status quo is predictably related to the
balance of hardships in the foregoing way, then perhaps the bifurcated stan-
dard applied in the Second, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits is theoretically sound
for these reasons.
b. The Failure of the Proxy Under the Economic Model
Although the foregoing represents the best theoretical case for the bifur-
cated status quo standard, the argument ultimately fails under the economic
model. First, the status quo is not a reliable predictor of irreparable harm. As
explained in detail above, the "status quo" historically was conceived as a
rationale or explanation for the courts' exercise ofpreliminary equitable relief,
not as a substantive standard with independent doctrinal significance. The
economic model helps to justify this historical understanding of the role of the
status quo. Statistically, itmaybethat injunctions preserving the status quo are
more likely to minimize irreparable harm, while injunctions upsetting the status
quo tend to multiply such harms. But clearly there are exceptions to this
"rule.11M
290. In this sense, Leubsdorf seems to have overstated the point in his own brief analysis
of the status quo. Leubsdorf asserted that "[e]mphasis on preserving the status quo is a habit
without a reason," in that "a court interferes just as much when it orders the status quo preserved
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In fact, the recent cases out ofthe Second, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits illus-
trate this point. Consider the Ninth Circuit's decision in Stanley and the Tenth
Circuit's decision in the SCFC LC case. It is true that in both cases the court
concluded that the balance of hardships favored denial of the "mandatory"
preliminary relief sought by the plaintiff, but that conclusion turned more on
the particular facts of the cases than on any inherent attribute of mandatory
relief. In Stanley, for example, the Ninth Circuit explicitly acknowledged that
plaintiffs "allegations of intentional sex discrimination, prospective loss of
reputation, business opportunity, and serious emotional distress" represented
harms that "could not be remedied by money damages." 91 Thus, its rejection
ofpreliminary reliefturned not on the nature ofthe plaintiff's harms, but on her
failure to establish a causal connection between her concededly irreparable
harms and any wrongful conduct by the University. The Tenth Circuit's anal-
ysis in the SCFC ILC case is similar. The SCFC ILC court's conclusion that
refusal of the injunction would not impose irreparable harm on the plaintiff
turned on the plaintiff's failure to present concrete, non-speculative proof of
potential irreparable harm to its business,' not on any notion that mandatory
relief requiring a defendant to do business with a plaintiff was somehow
incapable of causing such harm.
In fact, the Second Circuit's decision in Tom Doherty recognized that a
plaintiffmay suffer irreparable harm under just such analogous circumstances.
There, the plaintiff sought a "mandatory" injunction requiring the owner ofthe
"Power Rangers" property to license the plaintiffs publication of a 'Juvenile
story book" based on this valuable property. 3 The Second Circuit affirmed
the entry of this injunction, and in so doing it expressly acknowledged that
denial of this relief would have imposed irreparable injury on the plaintiff
publisher:
If preliminary relief is not available, [plaintiff] will lose an opportunity to
become a major publisher of children's books - that is to say, it will lose
an opportunityto become a sufficientlywell-knownpublisher of children's
books to attract additional authors and owners of characters.... [TMhe
value of a Power Rangers book to [plaintiff's] fortunes as a children's
as when it changes it." Leubsdorf supra note 4, at 546. In my view, the problem is not that the
courts' "habit" is completely irrational, but that the rationale is overbroad. Statistically, it may
be wise to preserve the status quo and to refuse to upset it in the run of the cases. The problem
is that there are exceptions to the rule, and no predictable way to ensure that the rule's applica-
tion stays within the bounds set by its rationale.
291. Stanley, 13 F.3d at 1324 n.5.
292. See SCE' ]LC, 936 F.2d at 1100 (analyzing claim of irreparable harm if injunction
were not granted).
293. See Tom Doherty Assocs. v. Saban Entm't, Inc., 60 F.3d 27, 32 (2d Cir. 1995) (dis-
cussing facts and procedural history).
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publisher is beyond ready calculation. It is a wholly unique opportunity,
and the amount of damages -inparticular, the loss ofprospectivebusiness
from additional children's authors or owners of characters- will be largely
indeterminate ff the opportunity is denied?'"
Thus, even in the Circuits that accord doctrinal significance to the status
quo, the case law demonstrates that there is no necessary correlation between
the status quo and irreparable harm The lack of such a correlation substan-
tially undermines the conceptual viability of a heightened burden. Returningagain to the formal model, if the status quo tells us nothing about the ratio of
Hp / Hd, then there is no defensible basis for imposing any a priori standard
for plaintiff's showing of likelihood of success on the merits (P). The same
point may be rephrased in terms of the two types of error noted above. If
there is no clear correlation between the status quo and relative harms, there
is no theoretical reason to err on the side of a wrongful denial or wrongful
entry of a preliminary injunction, and thus no basis for adopting the bifurcated
standard that currently prevails in the Second, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits.
A potential response to this argument might proceed as follows: Even if
the status quo is not perfectly correlated to the balance of hardships, it may
nevertheless be justifiable in that (a) it is correlated in the run-of-the-mill
cases and (b) it is simpler and less costly to apply than a direct examination
of the balance of hardships. This argument introduces an additional variable
into the economic model: private and public costs of litigation. It posits that
reliance on the status quo may be economically justifiable if it generates
savings in litigation costs that outweigh any corresponding increase in irrepa-
rable harm that would result from a failure to examine the balance of hard-
ships more directly. 5
In fact, however, the status quo standard has the opposite effect on
litigation costs. The status quo is not only an unreliable proxy, it is also a
costly one - more costly than a direct examination of the substantive issue of
relative harms. As explained in detail below, the inquiry into the nature of the
injunctive order at issue and its effect on the status quo is likely to consume
significant litigation resources. Moreover, even under the heightened stan-
dard, the court's conclusion that a given order will upset the status quo does
not end the analysis; the court must still evaluate the traditional factors to
determine whether the moving party's likelihood of success is sufficiently
294. Id. at 38.
295. This approach flows directly from the economic literature examining a broad array
of procedural mechanisms. See, e.g., Thomas K. Lee, Pleading and Proof: The Economics of
Legal Burdens, 1997 B.Y.U. L. Rxv. 1, 4 (introducing economic model for analysis of legal
rules assigning burdens of pleading and burdens of proof and analogizing model to other
procedural models developed in economic literature).
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clear or whether its irreparable harms substantially outweigh those identified
by the non-moving party. Thus, the effect of the bifurcated approach is to
impose an additional level of inquiry without simplifying the examination of
the traditional factors.2
Consider again the recent cases in the Second, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits.
Before the courts in those circuits can proceed to an evaluation of the balance
of hardships or the likely outcome on the merits, they must first reach a
decision as to the "mandatory" or "prohibitory" nature ofthe injunction and/or
its effect on the "status quo." The inherent ambiguity of these standards
virtually assures that the parties will dedicate substantial litigation resources
to convincing the court that their conception of the nature of the injunction is
more accurate, particularly where the label that the court arrives at dictates
whether the plaintiff faces a heightened standard of proof.
These standards are far from self-defining. A defendant's mandatory
conception of an order can almost always be rephrased by a competent plain-
tiff's attorney in prohibitory terms, and the notion of the "status quo" is at
least as subjective. The Ninth Circuit in Stanley, for example, thought that
the plaintiff in that case was seeking a mandatory injunction to require the
University to hire her as its women's basketball coach at a salary comparable
to that paid to the men's coach, but her own attorney was deft enough to frame
the moving papers in the prohibitory form of an order enjoining the University
"from forcing plaintiff to enter into an unfair and sex discriminatory contract
and interfering with plaintiff['s] continued performance as head coach of
women's basketball."' And in the SCFC ILC case, the Tenth Circuit charac-
terized the order sought by the plaintiff as altering the status quo, since it
would have "required Visa to approve [plaintiff's] 1.5 million card order,"'
296. One response to this conclusion would be that the status quo inquiry might produce
litigation-cost savings if the four factors are more efficiently evaluated under the heightened
standard than they are under the standard balance. My sense from reading the cases, however,
is that the inquiry into whether the four factors weigh "heavily and compellingly" in the moving
party's favor is not much simpler than the standard inquiry into whether the four factors support
the moving party.
297. See Developments in the Law-Injunction, 78 HARV. L. REV. 994, 1058 (1965) (con-
eluding that "[t]he concept status quo lacks sufficient stability to provide a satisfactory founda-
tion for judicial reasoning," and that "[tihe better course is to consider directly how best to
preserve or create a state of affairs in which effective relief can be awarded to either party at the
conclusion of the trial"); Leubsdorf, supra note 4, at 546 (asserting that "[t]he test is not even
easy to apply, since it eddies off into conundrums about what status is decisive"); see also Int'l
Union, United Mine Workers v. Bagwell, 512 U.S. 831, 835 (1994) (acknowledging that "in
borderline cases injunctive provisions containing essentially the same command can be phrased
either in mandatory or prohibitory terms").
298. Stanley v. Univ. of S. Cal., 13 F.3d 1313, 1320 (9th Cir. 1994).
299. SCFC ILC, Inc. v. VISA USA, Inc., 763 F. Supp. 1094,1099 (D. Utah 1991).
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but the district court below had accepted the plausible argument that the order
merely preserved the status quo in the sense that Visa's existing regulations
required Visa to give "routine authorization" to such applications by existing
members.
300
The Second Circuit's decision in Phillip v. Fairfield University also
illustrates the definitional ambiguities inherent in the heightened standard. °
According to the Second Circuit, the plaintiffs request for an injunction in
that case was "appropriately viewed as prohibitory" because it would "re-
strain[ ] the NCAA from acting affirmatively to interfere with [the Univer-
sity's] decision to award plaintiff a scholarship and to allow him to play
basketball."'3' At the same time, the Second Circuit thought that the injunc-
tion would preserve the status quo, since it would "permit[ ] Fairfield and
Phillip to continue the relationship to which they had agreed - that between
student-athlete and university.1303 Again, the court's conclusions are hardly
self-evident. Without the court's intervention, Fairfield's "relationship" with
the NCAA would have prohibited Phillip from becoming a "student-athlete"
at the University. NCAA rules allowed students who fail to qualify under
traditional academic criteria to participate in NCAA-sanctioned sports only
if the NCAA agreed to a waiver.3 4 Thus, without court intervention, the
"status quo" arguably was that the University could not consummate its
relationship with Phillip by offering him a scholarship to participate as a
student-athlete. In this sense, the injunction was a mandatory order requiring
the NCAA to grant a temporary waiver and altering the status quo.
Thus, in each of these recent cases, the courts might just as easily have
reached the conclusion that the injunction at issue was not subject to the
heightened standard. Because the application ofthe heightened standard turns
on questions that have no objective, determinate answer, it can be expected
to impose at least two kinds of costs not incurred in the absence of such a
300. Id. at 1098. The district court could have found support for this conclusion in those
cases that suggest that preservation of the status quo may sometimes require a mandatory order,
particularly "where the status quo is a condition not of rest, but of action." Ferry-Morse Seed
Co. v. Food Corn, Inc., 729 F.2d 589, 593 (8th Cir. 1984); see also In re Providence Journal
Co., 820 F.2d 1342, 1351 (1st Cir. 1986), modified on other grounds, 820 F.2d 1354 (lst Cir.
1987) (en bane) (concluding that "[tihe status quo of daily newspapers is to publish news
promptly that editors decide to publish"). The historical discussion above reveals that the courts
have long understood that mandatory orders may sometimes be necessary to preserve the status
quo. See supra notes 146-67. The courts that adopt a heightened standard have lost sight of
this fact, and have magnified the definitional ambiguities by assigning doctrinal significance to
the nature of an order and to its effect on the status quo.
301. See supra notes 49-55 and accompanying text (discussing Phillip).
302. Phillipv.FairflieldUniv., 118 F.3d 131,134 (2dCir. 1997).
303. Id.
304. Id. at 133.
58 WASH. &LEE L. REV 109 (2001)
standard. First, the bifurcated standard will produce litigation costs: parties
and their counsel will invest time and resources in attempting to convince the
court of their own view of the nature of the injunction at issue, and courts
themselves (both district and appellate) will expend their own time and
resources on this hollow inquiry. Second, the heightened standard will give
rise to what might be termed "error costs;"3 °5 it will produce decisions that
turn on arbitrary and capricious considerations, since the legal standard itself
is incapable of consistent, reasoned application.
Accordingly, the economic model unambiguously rejects the heightened
standard applied by the Second, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits. In calling for an
inquiry into the nature of an injunctive order and its effect on the status quo,
these courts simply compound the costs associated with the resolution of a
motion for preliminary injunction.
Conclusion
The trend in the federal circuits toward a heightened preliminary injunc-
tion standard in cases involving mandatory orders that upset the status quo has
little to recommend it. History points decidedly against this approach. The
notion of a heightened standard of proof is the misguided product of recent
twentieth-entury opinions; it finds no support in early decisions in English
Chancery or even in this country. The economic conception of the role of
preliminary injunctions points to the same conclusion. Continued retention
of the hollow inquiry into the nature of an injunction or its effect on the status
quo will give rise to additional costs without producing any offsetting bene-
fits.
305. For a discussion of the element of "error costs" in other contexts, see Lee, supra note
295, at 5 (explaining that "[e]rror costs are the social costs associated with erroneous legal
judgments" and are function of "the standard of proof used by the court, the allocation of
burdens, and the court's level of confidence in the accuracy of its decision"); A. Mitchell
Polinsky & Steven Shavell, Legal Error, Litigation, and the Incentive to Obey the Law, 5 J. L.
ECON. & ORG. 99,108 (1989) (analyzing effect of legal errors on decision to bring suit and on
incentive to obey law).
